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Executive Summary 
This is a survey of 400 in-house lawyers working in public, third and commercial sectors. We set out 
here the findings at the highest level.  A number of organisations assisted with the distribution of the 
survey.1 
This report provides a unique profile of real differences within the in-house community. We examine 
individual and team orientations to the in-house role; the invocation of professional principles; and 
ethical infrastructure, ethical pressure and 
relationships with the employer. We relate 
these to externally validated indicators of 
ethical inclination: (i) moral attentiveness (the 
extent to which people deal with problems as 
moral problems and the extent to which people 
identify moral problems); and (ii) moral 
disengagement (the extent to which people are 
inclined to morally disengage to behave 
unethically without feeling distress). It is as rich 
a picture of what it means to be an ethical in-
house lawyer as has ever been attempted. A 
more detailed summary and discussion of our 
findings is found in the final chapter of the main report for those who would like to know more but do 
not have the appetite or time to read the whole report. 
Through this research we profile the characteristics of individuals, teams and environments most 
associated with a stronger or weaker inclination to behave ethically. It is important to emphasise 
that this mapping of the ‘moral compass’ of in-house lawyers shows that ethicality is associated with 
individual and professional notions of the in-house role but also with team orientations and the 
broader organisational environment. Ethicality is both a systemic and individual phenomenon. We 
think the systemic lesson is important: there is too much emphasis in legal circles on thinking that 
ethics is about being the right sort of individual. That kind of thinking is complacent and dangerous. 
As we show here, individuals, systems and cultures mesh together in meaningful and measurable 
ways to increase or reduce ethical risk. As numerous corporate scandals have shown, such ethical 
risk puts individual lawyers at risk of professional misconduct but it also encourages poor quality 
decision-making for the organisations that employ in-house lawyers: short-termism and sharp 
practice can lead to catastrophic error. 
 
                                               
1
 See acknowledgments. 
This mapping of the ‘moral compass’ of 
in-house lawyers shows that ethicality is 
associated with individual and 
professional notions of the in-house role 
but also with team orientations and the 
broader organisational environment. 
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FOUR ETHICAL IDENTITIES 
To help understand the diversity in ethical identities, we identify four main groups of in-house 
lawyers (described in more detail in Chapter 9):  
 the Capitulators (who are reasonably morally attentive but are under ethical pressure and 
are less morally engaged);  
 the Coasters (who do not perceive themselves as under ethical pressure and have 
moderate-low levels of moral attentiveness but not lower moral disengagement);  
Initial findings at a glance 
400 respondents 
 
10-15% experienced elevated ethical 
pressure 
 
30-40% sometimes experienced ethical 
pressure 
 
Close to 50% agreed that actions were 
sometimes taken against their advice on legally 
important matters 
 
Ethical pressure was highest in public sector 
organisations 
 
53% of the GCs in our sample reported to the 
CEO 
 
16% reported to the CFO 
 
10% reported to another board member 
 
6% report to a non-executive board member or 
the chairman 
 
Less than half of in-house lawyers line-
managed by the CEO had a formal or informal 
reporting line to the chair of the board, chair of 
audit or other non-executive director. 
 
 
 
36% agreed that loopholes in the law 
should be identified that benefit the 
business 
 
9% indicated saying “no” to the 
organisation was to be avoided, even 
when there is no legally acceptable 
alternative to suggest 
 
 
For 65% achieving what their 
organisation wants has to be their main 
priority 
 
30% said an emphasis on commercial 
awareness sometimes inhibits the in-
house lawyer in performing his or her role 
 
12% said where commercial desirability 
and legal professional judgement are in 
tension, commercial desirability is more 
important 
 
7% never discussed professional ethics 
issues with colleagues internally or 
externally, formally or informally. For most 
in-house teams, formal and informal 
ethical infrastructure was limited.   
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 the Comfortably Numb (who do not perceive high levels of ethical pressure and have low 
levels of moral attentiveness and higher moral disengagement – the most concerning of the 
four groups); and, 
 the  Champions (who are under the highest levels of ethical pressure but retain the highest 
levels of moral attentiveness and the lowest levels of moral disengagement).  
Against these four groups, we map data on in-house role, team orientation, approach to 
professional principles and so on, to see what kinds of characteristics are most commonly 
associated with each of our four groups and our underlying indicators of ethical inclination. Through 
such a process we provide insight into the correlates of 
ethicality in practice. 
ETHICAL PRESSURE 
Chapter 3 sets out the findings on pressures in the 
organisation. In particular, we measure reported 
pressure to advise on unlawful and/or unethical 
practices. Our examination suggests that ethical 
pressure might be described as elevated in about 10-
15 per cent of our sample and sometimes apparent in 
about 30-40 per cent of respondents.  
Although our sample is broadly representative of the 
in-house population, a survey of this kind is likely to 
attract lawyers more interested in ethics, and so we should be wary of generalising the figure to all 
in-house lawyers.  
Ethical pressure was more elevated amongst the lawyers working in the public sector, but it was 
also found in all sectors. 
IDEAS ABOUT ROLE 
The report also explores differences in the role and team orientations of lawyers working in-house. 
Some differences reflect organisational characteristics. So, lawyers working in the public sector 
place a stronger emphasis on independence, and lawyers working in business put a stronger 
emphasis on a commercial orientation. There are similar differences in team orientation. Importantly 
though, individual and team orientations differ within sectors, and this research shows that such 
orientations have a significant association with ethical inclination. 
How practitioners conceive of the in-house role is a central concern of this research and of 
practitioners themselves (see Chapter 4). We identify five particular kinds of orientation.  
A commercial orientation is commonly supported by in-house lawyers, especially but not only, those 
working in business. The research evidences links between a stronger commercial orientation and 
weaker ethical inclination. This suggests the need for the role of in-house lawyers to be 
conceptualised in ways that restrain or balance the commercial orientation. Our data also suggest a 
neutral advisor orientation (which risks lawyers seeing themselves as mere servants of the 
employer, without their own influence) and an exploitation of uncertainty orientation (seeing 
uncertainty and looking for loopholes as things to benefit the employer) can be similarly problematic.  
There are good reasons why the 
line management of in-house 
lawyers would come from the 
executive side of an organisation, 
but we would question the limited 
extent to which senior in-house 
lawyers appear to have formal or 
informal reporting lines to non-
executive directors. 
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Independence and ethical orientations are associated with greater ethical inclination. Most 
respondents support ideas of independence and ethicality, but do so with varying levels of intensity.  
 
Chapter 5 looks at team orientation. Team orientations similarly reflect ethical and, although there 
was less consensus here, societal dispositions. These orientations were generally less strong than 
commercial, financial and effectiveness oriented concerns. Where independence, ethicality and 
societal concerns were more strongly supported, respondents were more ethically attentive and 
engaged.  
The report also contains data on the representation of in-house lawyers on boards and their 
reporting lines (see Chapter 2). There are good reasons why the line management of in-house 
lawyers would come from the executive side of an organisation, but we would question the limited 
extent to which senior in-house lawyers appear to have formal or informal reporting lines to non-
executive directors.  
 
PROFESSIONALISM AND ETHICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
Existing research suggests that in-house lawyers are not as clear as they might be about when or 
how to invoke professional principles. This issue goes to the heart of whether there is anything 
special about a professional lawyer working in a business. In Chapter 6, we look at respondents’ 
invocation of professional principles in the resolution of problems.  
Our respondents suggested that client interests were prioritised more often than the principles of 
integrity and effectiveness, which in turn were prioritised more than the principles of independence 
and legality. This is not consistent with the approach required under professional codes.  
Conversely, those who prioritised these obligations in a way more consistent with the codes – that 
is, those who more often saw the principles of independence and legality as important to their 
decision-making, even if they did not see independence as more important than other elements of 
Commercial orientation  
Neutral advisor orientation 
Exploitation of uncertainty 
orientation 
Independence orientation 
Ethical orientation 
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the principles – were also the most ethically inclined of our respondents. These respondents had a 
more rounded, less narrow, view of their professional obligations. 
In Chapter 7, we examine the management of professional ethics by in-house teams. We draw 
attention to the general paucity of ethical infrastructure within in-house teams, by which we mean 
the general absence or infrequency of formal guidance, training and informal discussion on 
professional ethical matters. Given the level of ethical pressure experienced by respondents, we 
think this is a concern. 
THE CENTRAL LESSON 
Our analysis of the data and our four archetypes show that a stronger ethical infrastructure, as well 
as the individual, team and professional orientations we have discussed, are all associated with a 
more ethical (and we would say more professional) in-house lawyer. 
We think this last finding is the most important and deserves emphasis. Our research suggests that 
ethical in-house practice is about individual understandings of the role; it is about the approach of 
teams and the organisations those teams work in; it is about understanding and drawing on all the 
obligations of professionalism; and, it is about building a better infrastructure to manage the 
tensions within the role. We can but speculate on what corporate mishaps might have been avoided 
or managed better, with concomitant reduction in social and economic harm; or what stress could 
have been avoided, or how many careers could have been saved, by understanding and acting on 
this.  
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WHAT’S NEXT? 
It is also important to emphasise that this is not a report which tells in-house lawyers how to behave 
ethically. Nor do we offer specific solutions. Solutions depend on context: they should be tailored to 
the needs of individuals, teams and their employers; and they are best led, in our view, by the in-
house community themselves. Some will respond defensively, but we hope this research provides a 
spur to action. In Part II of our Ethical Leadership project, we are taking forward these issues in 
discussion with the in-house community. The lawyers we have met, and those we have interviewed, 
have been enormously helpful, engaging, thoughtful and challenging. Their response speaks to a 
rich river of professionalism as well as the need for improvement. We will be reporting on this work 
in due course. 
The plan is to produce a white paper which sets out ideas about how best to structure the in-house 
role and manage in-house legal functions for ethical practice. This white paper will be led in large 
part by discussion with the in-house community, and informed by our research. For now, we make 
the following observations: 
 The varied understandings of the in-house role suggest that in-house teams should engage 
in an honest and open evaluation of their own approaches and consider where on the 
spectrum of approaches we have outlined they sit. 
 The evaluation should engage the employer and their in-house teams. 
 The balance between a commercial (or, outside business, a client-delivery) orientation and 
independence and ethical orientations should be a particular focus of this review, with 
consideration given to how independence and ethicality become part of the role description, 
reporting and day-to-day management of in-house teams. 
 The balancing and use of professional principles in day-to-day practice – especially those 
that promote integrity, independence and ethicality – should be considered and supported. 
 The approach to managing for ethicality through ethical infrastructure (such as training, 
guidance, appraisal and discussion) should be considered as a matter of urgency. 
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1 Introduction 
This report is part of a broader study and process of engagement with in-house lawyers and those 
who manage and lead them. We are engaging in discussions with the in-house community at town 
hall meetings and we are conducting further in-depth interviews to explore the issues we raise here, 
and to look in greater depth at ideas about best practice. Through these mechanisms we are 
planning to contextualise our findings and think in greater detail about the implications of our results.  
This report looks at data from 400 in-house lawyers in business, public and third sectors. Our 
respondents came from large and small teams, and with wide-ranging levels of experience. There is 
a broad representation of gender, role type (GCs and other roles, board-members and non-board 
members), and levels of experience in-house. 
AIMS OF THE STUDY 
The aim of the report is to provide insights on approaches to ethicality within in-house legal teams. 
In particular, we examine: 
 How do in-house lawyers see their identity and their role? Whilst a tension which we 
explore is one between the lawyer as servant of their employer and as independent 
professional, the actual picture is significantly more complex: commercial, neutral advisor, 
exploitative, ethical and independence orientations vie for supremacy. We also look at how 
our lawyers see their professional obligations.  
 How is the role structured: what are its reporting lines and what are the orientations of the 
teams within which our lawyers work? Are they ethically oriented, societally oriented, 
financially oriented or delivery oriented? 
 What are their relationships within the organisation: what kinds of line management and 
reporting lines are there? Are relations with the organisation positive or weak? Are there 
indicators of ethical pressure? Do in-house lawyers come under pressure to do things 
which they see as unlawful or unethical, for example? 
 The culture and infrastructure within the organisation. What are the orientations of the 
teams within which our lawyers work? What is the ethical infrastructure like within their 
teams? 
This provides us with a detailed, quantitative overview of in-house practice. We are also able to 
relate that to indicators of inclination to behave unethically. Collecting data on incidences of 
positive or negative ethicality through a survey is fraught with problems. Instead, we are able to 
collect data on moral attentiveness and moral disengagement: which are predictors of ethical 
misconduct (such as lying and cheating). 
We are able to relate these predictors of inclination to behave unethically with our data on identity, 
role, infrastructure and the like, to suggest what characteristics of in-house individuals and teams 
were most strongly associated with ethical inclination. We hope these findings will provide food for 
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thought for in-house lawyers, their teams and the non-lawyers they report to or work with. We are 
engaged now in testing and exploring some of the issues we have seen here through town-hall 
meetings and interviews with in-house lawyers.  
It is a process of discussion and exploration that we commend to anyone interested in the report. 
For any in-house lawyers or leaders we say this: please find the time to read the findings and 
discuss them with your colleagues. We provide an executive summary at the front of the report and 
a longer discussion at the end of the report for those not able to read the whole thing. 
What we should emphasise is that what we are not doing is calibrating a level of unethical conduct 
amongst in-house lawyers. Such a calibration is difficult to do in practice, we do not do it here, and 
we warn against interpreting our findings in this way or in drawing out elements of the data as a 
vehicle for sensational criticism. We are not measuring wrongdoing. What we are seeking to do is 
provide a set of insights about what is associated with more or less ethical approaches within in-
house teams. Whilst our data sometimes gives us cause for concern, we see this concern as 
underlying the desirability of improvement, and informing an on-going process of improvement. That 
our respondents were willing to engage in the process, and that many have them have engaged in 
the next stage of our work is testament to their professionalism and interest in development. 
 
DATA OVERVIEW 
Data was collected on the following sets of concepts from 400 in-house lawyers from business, 
public and third sectors. 
The concepts are made up of the more detailed variables below and illustrated in Figure 1.  
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Individual Background 
Years of practice 
Professional 
qualifications 
Jurisdictions 
Years working in-house 
Gender 
Organisation 
Size of in-house legal team 
Percentage of not qualified 
personnel 
Size of organisation 
Type of organisation 
Main business /activity  
Location of business 
Role structure 
Role 
Line manager 
Other reporting lines  
Lawyers on the board 
Lawyers on executive committee 
 
In-House Identity 
Broad work identity  
Orientations: 
Commercial 
Independence  
Ethical  
Exploitation of 
uncertainty 
Neutral advisor 
Relations with the Business 
Support and tensions 
Pressure - legality 
Pressure - ethicality  
 
Professional Orientation 
Client’s Best Interests 
Independence and Legality 
Integrity and Effectiveness 
Team Orientation 
Financial, Societal or  
Ethical 
Ethical Infrastructure 
Guidance 
Training 
Formal and informal  
communications 
Ethics Performance  
appraisal 
  
 
 
Figure 1: Data overview 
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We also collected data on other variables, including attitude to regulation, and (importantly) data 
which allows us to assess: 
 moral attentiveness (the extent to which people deal with problems as moral problems and 
the extent to which people identify moral problems);2 and, 
 
 moral disengagement (the extent to which people are inclined to morally disengage, to 
behave unethically without feeling distress). 
As we are unable to measure ethical conduct directly, we use these indicators of moral 
attentiveness and moral disengagement as proxy measures for the inclination to behave ethically. 
They are indicators developed by psychologists which have been validated in a number of contexts 
and are less prone to social response bias than more direct questions about engagement in 
unethical conduct. These indicators are shown to be associated with unethical behaviour. In this 
way they are similar to popular notions of the moral compass, but as we will see that moral compass 
is related not only to individual characteristics but also to environmental factors, such as team 
orientation and pressures in the organisational environment. 
Moral attentiveness is a potentially important predictor of ethicality. We examine it across two 
dimensions: “perceptual moral attentiveness, the extent to which the individual recognizes moral 
aspects in everyday experiences, and reflective moral attentiveness, the extent to which the 
individual regularly considers moral matters.”3 A more morally attentive person is more likely to 
recall and report morally related behaviour, and moral attentiveness is associated with more moral 
behaviour.4 
Moral disengagement is the extent to which people process decisions and behaviour with ethical 
significance that allows those inclined to morally disengage to behave unethically without feeling 
distress. It is claimed to explain a significant proportion of in-work misconduct.5 The authors of the 
measure “cautiously” suggest it is, “the strongest individual 6  predictor of unethical behaviour 
identified to date,”7 as well as being a practical test for adult respondents which is not generally 
prone to significant social desirability biases.8 Moral disengagement may be particularly important in 
organisational contexts.9 
  
                                               
2
 Reynolds. S (2008), “Moral Attentiveness: Who pays attention to the moral aspects of life?” 93(5) Journal of Applied Psychology 1027-
1041 
3
 Ibid 
4
 Ibid 
5
Celia Moore and others, ‘Why Employees Do Bad Things: Moral Disengagement and Unethical Organizational Behavior’ (2012) 65 
Personnel Psychology 1. 
6
 Environmental /situational influences may for example be contrasted with influences deriving from the individual. 
7
Moore and others (n 5) 40. 
8
 Social response biases occurs where a person answers questions in ways likely to over- or under-report good or bad behaviour 
because of the desire to appear more favourably to others. 
9
Moore and others (n 5) 11. 
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SUMMARY - INTRODUCTION 
As far as we are aware, this work represents the most detailed quantitative profiling of in-house 
lawyers undertaken anywhere. It uniquely links data on organisations, individuals, individual and 
team identities and approaches to professional principles to externally validated proxy measures of 
the inclination to behave ethically. In this way we map the moral compass of in-house lawyers. Also 
uniquely, we are able to map out a diversity of identity and understandings about the in-house role 
and evidence likely links between those understandings and the ethicality of in-house lawyers. 
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2 The in-house lawyers and their organisations 
This section of the report outlines data on our sample of respondents covering the kinds of 
organisations they worked in, the line management and reporting lines, the size of teams and basic 
data on individuals (gender, length of post qualification experience, etc.). 
The findings come from our survey of in-house lawyers carried out in England and Wales in 2015. 
The Solicitors Regulation Authority allowed us to contact their list of registered in-house solicitors 
(either on the Roll, or with practising certificates), but we also sought contacts through a variety of 
other routes. The survey was distributed by the Bar Association for Commerce and Industry and the 
Association of Corporate Counsel to their members and to the extensive in-house contacts of Legal 
Business magazine. We are very grateful to those organisations for their help. The survey was 
completed by 400 in-house lawyers.  
Our sample was marginally more experienced than the population of in-house lawyers from which 
they were drawn.10 
 There is a good range of experience in the sample (Figure 2): a quarter of respondents had 
been admitted eight years or less, half had 15 years or more experience, and a quarter had 
in excess of 24 years of post-qualification experience.  
 About two thirds had more than five years of experience of working in-house.  
 As we can see, about 60 percent of our sample had less than five years of experience of 
private practice.  
                                               
10
 The SRA provided data on gender, date of qualification and work areas which we compared with the data from our survey respondents. 
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Figure 2: Years post-qualification, in-house and in private practice 
Secondly, we can compare gender. Women were somewhat underrepresented in our survey – 
although not dramatically so (53 percent in our survey compared to 57 percent in the population of 
solicitors in-house based on SRA data). 
Table 1: Gender, Population and Survey 
 Population Survey 
 N % N % 
Female 15,547 57.1 212 53.0 
Male 11,552 42.4 187 46.8 
Unknown 122 0.4 1   0.3 
Total 27,221 100 400 100 
 
Thirdly, we have data on the types of organisation in which our respondents work. Our survey 
grouped lawyers into three broad categories which we compare against the SRA’s categories.11 We 
can see that in-house lawyers working in business are more strongly represented in our survey, 
although again the difference is not dramatic.  
                                               
11
 The SRA have more detailed categories which we collapsed into business, public and third sectors. 
0%
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Table 2: Categories of Workplace 
 SRA Data Survey Sample 
Business 63.7 67.3 
Charity/Social Enterprise 4.5 7.3 
Public Sector 31.9 25.4 
 
In broad terms, the survey respondents are fairly representative of the SRA population (at least on 
these characteristics). Low response rates can produce samples representative of broader 
populations if the samples responses do not indicate particularly strong views on any issue.12 We 
see that in general they do not, and might surmise that the survey has had a relatively even 
response among the underlying population of in house lawyers. However, it is important to consider 
how characteristics of the responding sample might differ from the population. A risk is that we 
attracted a sample particularly interested in ethics and/or ethical leadership within in-house teams. 
As such we do not assert the sample’s representativeness. Instead, we concentrate on differences 
within the sample to explore differences in ethical environment, professional role and ethical 
motivation and engagement.  
 
ROLE AND QUALIFICATIONS 
Our respondents were typically General Counsel (GCs) (27 percent of the sample) or in another 
senior in-house legal role (42 percent).13 26 percent identified as in-house legal, and 5 percent as 
‘other’.14 
In terms of professional qualification (here, respondents may have multiple qualifications, so the 
overall percentage totals > 100 percent): 
 95 percent were qualified as solicitors; 
 6.5 percent were qualified as barristers; 
 2.7 percent were qualified as legal executives; 
 9.5 percent held other qualifications;15 and, 
 12 percent of our respondents had multiple professional qualifications.  
Although 18 percent had qualifications in more than one jurisdiction, respondents were principally 
qualified in England and Wales (Table 3). 
                                               
12
 Robert M. Groves etal (2011) Survey Methodology (John Wiley & Sons) 
13
 In many companies of a certain size (usually multinationals) the term “General Counsel” is often applied to the most senior lawyer in a 
country, BU or division 
14
 ‘Other’ roles includeda variety of in-house legal or associated roles: from Chief Compliance Officer to Corporate Paralegal, directors of 
ethics and various legal management roles. 
15
 Such as the New York Bar. 
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Table 3: Jurisdictional qualifications 
 N  
percent 
England and Wales 387 96.3 
Scotland 15 3.7 
N Ireland 3 0.7 
EU 13 3.2 
USA 13 3.2 
Other 39 9.7 
Respondents may have multiple qualifications, so percent totals > 100 percent 
We also collected data on the type of business engaged in, based on ONS categories.16This 
provides an overview of the sectors within which the respondents work (Table 4). 
Table 4: Type of Business 
 N % 
Financial 58 14.4 
Public administration and compulsory social security 41 10.2 
Manufacturing 32 8.0 
Information and communication 32 8.0 
Professional, scientific and technical activities 24 6.0 
Construction 20 5.0 
Education 16 4.0 
Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply 14 3.5 
Real estate activities 14 3.5 
Human health and social work activities 14 3.5 
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles 13 3.2 
Insurance 13 3.2 
Arts, entertainment and recreation 10 2.5 
Defence 8 2.0 
Water supply; sewerage, waste management and remediation activities 6 1.5 
Mining and quarrying 5 1.2 
Administrative and support service activities 5 1.2 
Transportation and storage 4 1.0 
Accommodation and food service activities 4 1.0 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 2 0.5 
Other service activities 64 15.9 
Total 399 99.3 
 
                                               
16
 ONS UK Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 2007 Hierarchy categories 
http://www.neighbourhood.statistics.gov.uk/HTMLDocs/SIC/ONS_SIC_hierarchy_view.html 
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Most of our respondents worked for organisations headquartered in England and Wales, although 
over a quarter had headquarters outside of the UK and many had offices all over the World (Figure 
3). 
 
Figure 3: Headquarters and office locations 
 
GENDER 
Within our sample, proportionately more men were GCs than women. This was a modest and not 
statistically significant difference.17 
Table 5: Role by gender 
 Male Female 
GC or equivalent 28.9% 23.7% 
Senior In-House Legal 42.2% 42.2% 
In-house Legal 23.5% 28.9% 
Other (please specify) 5.3% 5.2% 
 187 211 
 
Similarly proportionately more men were working in the commercial sector, but again this was not a 
significant difference (Table 6). 
                                               
17
 Chi-Square was not significant. 
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Table 6: Organisation type by gender 
 Male Female 
A business 70.4% 64.5% 
A public sector organisation 24.7% 26.1% 
A charity/ social enterprise 4.8% 9.5% 
 186 211 
 
The men in our sample did tend to have been qualified for longer, and worked in bigger teams (both 
these differences were statistically significant). They had spent somewhat longer in-house and 
worked in bigger organisations on average (here the differences were not statistically significant).  
Table 7: Length of service and size of organisation and team by Gender 
  Male Female p=18 
How many years since you first qualified as a practising 
lawyer? 
% 17.2 15.0 0.022 
N 186 212  
How many years have you been working in-house? % 11.8 10.3 0.078 
N 187 212  
What is the approximate size of the in-house legal team in 
your organisation 
% 132.4 53.6 0.017 
N 185 211  
What is the approximate size of the organisation in terms of 
employees? 
% 21147 10369 0.104 
N 183 207  
 
SIZE OF TEAMS AND ORGANISATIONS 
The size of organisation and the size of the team that our respondents worked within differed 
widely. Organisation size was generally high (half worked in organisations above 1,500 employees) 
and, as one would expect, size of in-house team was partly a function of size of the organisation.19 
Table 8: Data on teams and Organisations 
 Mean Median 
Approximate size of the in-house legal team in your 
organisation (including paralegals) 
90 13 
Approximate percentage of your team are not qualified 
solicitors, barristers or legal executives 
27% 20% 
Approximate size of the organisation in terms of 
employees 
15,389 1,500 
We can see that half of in-house lawyers work in teams of 13 or fewer. In fact: 
                                               
18
 Independent T-tests were used to compare the means of men and women for these variables. 
19
 There was a statistically significant, moderate correlation, rs(388) = .474, p = .000 
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 a quarter were working in teams of five or fewer; 
 8 percent were (in) teams of one person); and 
 although the teams are dominated by admitted lawyers, 14 percent of our respondents had 
more than 50 percent non-admitted staff working in their teams.  
LINE MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING LINES 
The identity of an in-house lawyer’s line manager, and the reporting lines available, may have a 
significant influence on their status, influence and approach to the role. Table 9 explores line 
manager relationships for different levels of in-house lawyer. Other work on in-house lawyers 
suggests that those lawyers who are managed by and report directly to the Board are perceived by 
those in the organisation as having greater importance to the organisation than those lawyers who 
report to someone lower down the chain.20 As such, management and lines of reporting can speak 
to respect for, and importance of, the legal function. Equally, lawyers reporting directly to the Board 
allows the Board to have a better insight into the legal risks faced by the business, and the ways 
those risks can be managed.21 Coffee writes that, “In the absence of independent professionals — 
auditors, attorneys and analysts — boards will predictably receive a stream of selectively edited 
information from corporate managers that presents the incumbent management in the most 
favorable light possible.”22 In this way, in-house lawyers who report to, and are managed directly by, 
the Board, may be better able to demonstrate the value of the legal team in environments where 
that team may otherwise simply be seen as a cost centre. 23  Finally, such direct access and 
oversight may help to preserve the independence of the in-house lawyer from distorting influences 
elsewhere in the organisation. On the other hand, engagement in company decision making at the 
Board level may pose conflicts of interest for in-house lawyers and compromise – in subtle and not 
so subtle ways - their ability to advise independently. 
About a third of our respondents were line managed by a member of the Executive Board, whereas 
only 3.5 percent were managed by a Non-Executive. The remainder were managed by other 
lawyers or employees. 
                                               
20
 Prashant Dubey and Eva Kripalani, The Generalist Counsel: How Leading General Counsel are Shaping Tomorrow's Companies (OUP 
2013) 
21
 ABA Task Force on Corporate Responsibility, ‘Report of the American Bar Association Task Force on Corporate Responsibility’ (2003) 
59 BUS. LAW. 145, 161 
22
 John Coffee, Gatekeepers: The Role of the Professions and Corporate Governance (OUP 2006), 7 
23
 Omari Scott Simmons and James D. Dinnage, ‘Innkeepers: A Unifying Theory of the In-House Counsel Role’ (2011) 41 Setton Hall Law 
Review 77, 146. 
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Table 9: Line Manager by Role 
 Role  
Line Manager GC or 
equivalent 
Senior In-
House Legal 
In-house 
Legal 
Other 
(please 
specify) 
N 
The Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO) 
52.9% 6.0% 1.0% 14.3% 69 
The Chief Financial Officer 
(CFO) 
16.3% 1.2% 1.0% 4.8% 21 
Another senior Executive 
(Board Member) 
9.6% 12.5% 5.7% 14.3% 40 
Another employee of the 
business 
3.8% 4.8% 6.7% 9.5% 21 
Another lawyer24 11.5% 72.6% 82.9% 57.1% 233 
Another senior Non-
Executive on the Board 
1.0% 2.4% 1.0% 0.0% 6 
The Chair of the Audit 
Committee 
0.0% 0.0% 1.0% 0.0% 1 
The Chairman 4.8% 0.6% 1.0% 0.0% 7 
N 104 168 105 21 398 
An observation that may be worth making here is that our experience is that many GCs report 
seeing a reporting line to the CEO as an essential pre-requisite of their role. For the 48 percent that 
do not have that reporting line, it raises interesting questions about their ability to have influence on 
their own needs and whether they may be less effective in their roles than is ideal. 
If we simplify into three categories of those reported to (executive board members, non-executive 
board members and other lawyers/employees), we get a clearer sense of how many in-house 
lawyers are line managed by board members (Figure 4). 
 
                                               
24
 It may seem strange to have GCs reporting to other lawyers, but some organisations have GCs for divisions/particular sectors of their 
organisation and are regarded as being GCs in their own right given the size of their team, independence etc. 
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Figure 4: Role, Line Manager 
Whilst it is not surprising to see that many in-house lawyers have other lawyers or a member of the 
Executive Board as their line manager, the low level of line manager relationships with Non-
Executive Directors is of note. This might be particularly important if in-house lawyers were to 
exercise significant gate-keeper or governance roles. We followed this up by asking about other 
formal or informal reporting lines in the next two tables. 
Table 10: Other informal or formal reporting lines 
 % 
Another lawyer 22% 
Another senior Executive (Board Member) 18% 
The CEO 15% 
Another employee of the business 12% 
The Chairman 10% 
The CFO 9% 
Another senior Non-Executive on the Board 5% 
The Chair of the Audit Committee 3% 
 
Non-executive reporting lines, of a formal or informal nature, only appeared to be in place for 18 
percent of our respondents. 
In the next table we report the other lines of reporting (both formal and informal) seen in Table 10 
for each line management relationship. We can see that slightly less than half of those in-house 
lawyers who are line managed by CEOs tended to also have reporting lines to non-executive board 
members. So, for example only a third of those reporting to the CEO also had a line of reporting to 
the Chairman (and still fewer had reporting lines to other non-executives). The position for those 
who were line-managed by the CFO or other senior executive was of weaker reporting lines to the 
non-executive directors. Anecdotally, we have heard some concerns as to GC relationships 
managed by CFOs. The absence of reporting lines to non-executive directors may thus give rise to 
particular concern with this category. 
The interesting question this suggests is whether reporting lines to non-executive directors needs to 
be more extensive. As part of shifts towards better corporate governance, the numbers and 
importance of non-executive directors has grown. They are not corporate employees, almost 
exclusively sit part time and act (in theory) as wise counsellors and critics to the executive team. 
Non-executives are seen as holding the potential for important checks and balances on the exercise 
of powers by the executive, by bringing to the board a combination of expertise, independence and 
impartiality. 25  Having in-house lawyers report (either primarily or additionally) to non-executive 
directors may help to reinforce (for the lawyer, and the employer) that the corporation is the ultimate 
client and that its interests may, at times, conflict with senior executives, employees, and other 
                                               
25
 Charlie Weir and David Laing, ‘Governance structures, director independence and corporate performance in the UK.’ (2001) 13(2) 
European Business Review 86 
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corporate constituencies.26 As Weaver notes, “the close working relationship between management 
and [in-house] corporate counsel may create confusion and uncertainty about the role of corporate 
counsel in the representation of the organization.”27 As such, a number of scholars in the US have 
suggested that non-executive directors should have their own, wholly separate in-house lawyers.28  
 
 
Table 11: Informal and Formal Reporting Lines by Line Manager 
 Formal or informal reporting lines in addition to line manager 
 
 
 
Line Manager 
CEO CFO Other 
on 
Exec 
Board 
Chair
man 
Chair 
-Audit 
Senio
r Non-
Exec
Dir 
Another 
lawyer 
Another 
employe
e 
The CEO 4.3% 7.2% 15.9% 33.3% 5.8% 8.7% 5.8% 8.7% 
The CFO 47.6% 0.0% 19.0% 19.0% 14.3% 0.0% 4.8% 4.8% 
Another senior Executive 
(Board Member) 
22.5% 12.5% 20.0% 17.5% 10.0% 5.0% 2.5% 12.5% 
The Chairman 28.6% 28.6% 14.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
The Chair of the Audit 
Committee 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 
Another senior Non-
Executive on the Board 
33.3% 16.7% 33.3% 16.7% 0.0% 16.7% 33.3% 16.7% 
Another lawyer 12.0% 8.1% 17.9% 2.6% 1.3% 5.1% 32.1% 12.4% 
Another employee of the 
business 
23.8% 14.3% 23.8% 0.0% 0.0% 4.8% 23.8% 33.3% 
 
In Table 12 and Table 13 we examine legal presence on the board and/or the executive committee.  
                                               
26
 Simmons and Dinnage (n 21) 112 
27
 Sally R. Weaver, ‘Ethical Dilemmas of Corporate Counsel: A Structural and Contextual Analysis’ (1997) 46 EMORY L.J. 1023, 1028 
28
 See, for example: E. Norman Veasey, ‘Separate and Continuing Counsel for Independent Directors: An Idea Whose Time Has Not 
Come as a General Practice’ (2004) 59 BUS. LAW. 1413; and Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & Edward B. Rock, ‘A New Player in the 
Boardroom: The Emergence of the Independent Directors’ Counsel’ (2004) 59 BUS. LAW. 1389.  
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Table 12: Is there a senior lawyer on the board? 
 n % 
Yes, me, I am a member of the board 22 5.5 
Yes a/the GC is a member of the board 87 21.6 
Yes, me, I attend the board 30 7.5 
Yes a/the GC attends the board 58 14.4 
Yes a lawyer is a member of the board, but they are not part of the in-
house legal team 
27 6.7 
No 166 41.3 
Total 390 97 
Thus about sixty percent of our respondents reported that at least one in-house lawyer attended or 
sat the board. Thirteen percent of our sample attended the board (although often not as a member). 
Seven percent reported a lawyer who was not a member of the in-house team attended the board, 
perhaps reflecting a belief that in-house lawyers should not sit on the board and maintain a legal 
neutral advisor function. Here, it may be challenging for an in-house lawyer who sits on the board of 
their company to manage the multiple, and possibly conflicting, duties they would owe: as a director, 
as an employee and as a professional regulated by the relevant professional codes. 
Table 13: Is there a Senior Lawyer on the Executive Committee? 
 n % 
Yes, I am a member of the Executive Committee 50 12.4 
Yes a/the GC is a member of the Executive Committee 127 31.6 
Yes, I attend the Executive Committee 10 2.5 
Yes a/the GC attends the Executive Committee 56 13.9 
Yes a lawyer is a member of the Executive Committee,  
but they are not part of the in-house legal team 
19 4.7 
No 124 30.8 
Total 386 96 
 
We see above that in-house representation is even stronger on the executive committee. 
 
SUMMARY- IN-HOUSE LAWYERS AND THEIR ORGANISATIONS 
This chapter sets out key descriptive data on the nature of our sample and compares it to the 
general population of in-house solicitors where we are able to as a way of benchmarking our 
sample against a national population (although our sample extends beyond solicitors).  
A key finding of interest from this chapter is the diverse informal and formal lines of management 
and reporting. Within our sample, we see how strongly executive rather than non-executive board 
members dominate lines of management and reporting. Of particular note is the proportion of 
General Counsel reporting to EO’s without informal reporting lines to non-executive directors. 
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3 Pressures in the organisation 
Most ethical issues are, to a significant but not total extent, products of the environment. We begin 
our ethical profiling of in-house lawyers by looking in more detail at the environments that they are 
working within. In this chapter we report survey data on pressures in the environment by looking at: 
 how employers were reported as seeing the role of in-house lawyers; and, 
 indicators of ethical pressure, such as being asked to advise on matters which give rise to 
ethical concerns or where the legal position is uncomfortable. 
 
HOW EMPLOYERS SEE THE ROLE OF THE IN-HOUSE LAWYER 
A common concern for in-house lawyers is that their organisations can be mistrustful of their 
lawyers, seeing them as deal-blockers rather than deal-makers, or costs centres, rather than part of 
the profit making enterprise. 29  In public sector contexts, they can be portrayed as inhibiting 
democratically legitimate policy making through the overly cautious interpretations of the law.30 Such 
a view is sometimes allied with a concern that lawyers are too conservative when it comes to taking 
risks or seen as legal perfectionists (wanting to eliminate risk rather than manage or accept some 
tolerance for legal problems with proposed courses of action). Equally and oppositely, overly 
aggressive appetite for risk may pose problems to the administration of justice, 31  and for 
organisations seeking to promote a culture of full compliance.32 
Seven questions were employed to examine the relationship between the respondent’s legal team 
(hereafter, ‘legal’) and the organisation that they worked within. Our analysis of the data suggested 
these can be meaningfully reduced to three components (see Appendix A):33 
                                               
29
 For a discussion of the evolution of the role in this context, see: Jenoff, Pam, ‘Going Native:  Incentive, Identity And The Inherent 
Ethical Problem Of In-House Counsel’  (June 20, 2011). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1868352; and Nabarro, ‘From In 
house lawyer to business counsel” (Naborro LLP 2010) – see: http://www.nabarro.com/downloads/from-in-house-lawyer-to-business-
counsel.pdf  
30
 Dame Ursula Brennan, former Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Justice indicated there had been a change in approach within the 
Government Legal Service a recent interview, “One of the things that has changed in the way we advise ministers is that we used to say: 
“You can do that, you can’t do that.” Now we more often say: “If you do that, there will be a legal challenge, and it’s quite likely we’ll lose.” 
And some ministers in those circumstances will give up, and others will say: “No, actually, if there’s a chance we might win,  I want to try. 
And as democratically elected politicians that is their prerogative.” Jess Bowie, ‘Dame Ursula Brennan: The Former Ministry of Justice 
Permanent Secretary on Why She Left the MoJ, What She’s Most Proud of – and Why It Can Be Tricky to Cut Senior Civil Service Roles 
Written’ Civil Service World (18 February 2016) <http://www.civilserviceworld.com/articles/interview/dame-ursula-brennan-former-
ministry-justice-permanent-secretary-why-she-left-moj> accessed 30 March 2016. 
31
 See, ibid. 
32
 This was a lesson we learnt from our risk work, Richard Moorhead and Steven Vaughan, ‘Legal Risk: Definition, Management and 
Ethics’ (Social Science Research Network 2015) SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 2594228 <http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2594228> 
accessed 4 February 2016. 
33
 Three components were extracted using principal component analysis, suggesting we are able to measure three underlying and 
separate constructs of the relationships between their organisations and legal with acceptable or good reliability: We report the reliability 
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i) the existence of sometimes negative relationships with the business;  
ii) the existence of positive and supportive relationships with the business; and  
iii) the existence of uneven relationships with the business. 
 
SOMETIMES RESISTANT/NEGATIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH THEIR EMPLOYER 
When we say later in the report that in-house lawyers reported sometimes resistant/negative 
relationships with their employer we are reporting a composite variable measured by three attitude 
statements from our survey:34 
 ‘Colleagues are sometimes reluctant to raise matters with in-house lawyers’; 
 ‘The legal function is sometimes criticised for inhibiting or slowing business decisions’; and, 
 ‘The organisation sometimes takes actions which are against my advice on legally important 
matters.’ 
 
 
Figure 5: Sometimes resistant/negative relationship with their employer 
We can see from Figure 5 that a sizeable majority (80 percent) agreed that legal was sometimes 
criticised for inhibiting or slowing decisions and a majority (57 percent) agreed that colleagues were 
                                                                                                                                                             
scores in as α below. 
34
 This scale was measured reliably, α= .71 
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sometimes reluctant to raise issues with legal. Close to 50 percent agreed that actions were 
sometimes taken against their advice on legally important matters. 
Interestingly, although differences between the three sectors were not large, the strongest 
agreement that there was sometimes a negative relationship came from the public sector lawyers.35 
POSITIVE AND SUPPORTIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH THEIR EMPLOYER 
When we say later in the report that in-house lawyers reported positive and supportive relationships 
with their employer we are reporting a composite variable measured by two variables:36 
 ‘There is a clear and common understanding within the business of what the role of the legal 
function is’; 
 ‘The independence of the legal function within the business is strongly supported by the 
business functions’. 
In contrast to some resistance or negativity towards the legal function being common, most of our 
respondents also felt supported by their organisations. However, a substantial minority - over one in 
five - did not. Again, although differences between the three sectors were not large, the strongest 
agreement that there was a positive relationship came from the business lawyers.37 
 
Figure 6: Positive and supportive relationship with the employer 
                                               
35
Anova suggested (p=<.000) there was a difference in the means of the composite measures for the three organisation types, and that 
the differences between public sector and business lawyers was significant, although the differences were not large. 
36
 α= .84 
37
Anova suggested (p=<.02) there was a difference in the means of the composite measures for the three organisation types, and that the 
differences between public sector and business lawyers was significant, although the differences were not large. 
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It is worth dwelling momentarily on the important minority of those that did not agree there was a 
clear and common understanding of the role of the legal within the organisation. Under 40 percent 
agreed that there was a clear and common understanding of their role.  A lack of such 
understanding is likely to lead to opportunities for pressure on, and unfair criticism and potential 
undermining of the legal function. 
EVENNESS OF RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE EMPLOYER 
A final way at looking at this issue is the evenness of relationships between legal and different parts 
of the organisation. This was measured by two questions:38 
 ‘Parts of the business are more challenging to in-house lawyers than others.’; and, 
 ‘Parts of the business are more supportive of legal than others.’ 
Here we see a widespread agreement with the idea that support and challenges for the legal 
function are unevenly distributed. The position taken on this indicator was common across the three 
sectors. 
 
Figure 7: Evenness of support/challenges 
In broad terms, then, our respondents reported working in organisations where they felt supported, 
but also in organisations where an unevenness of relationship was common and where they were 
sometimes criticised for being obstructive, and (and importantly) where about half agreed that action 
was sometimes taken against legal advice on important matters. Table 14 overviews the data on 
relationships with the organisation by organisation type. 
                                               
38
 α= .80 
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Table 14: Relationships with the business 
 A business Public sector 
organisation 
Charity/ 
social 
enterprise 
ANOVA 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD F p 
Resistant/Negative 
relationship with the 
business 
4.37 1.27 4.85 1.30 4.71 1.28 5.43 .01 
Positive/Supportive 
relationship with the 
business 
4.95 1.34 4.74 1.58 4.21 1.52 3.95 .02 
Uneven relationship with 
the business 
5.75 1.06 5.81 0.96 5.91 0.91 0.43 .65 
More detailed analysis showed: (i) those working in the public sector rated the legal department as 
having more negative/resistant relationships with the employer than those working in a business; 
and (ii) those working in a business felt they had a significantly more positive/supportive relationship 
with the employer, than those working in a charity/social enterprise. 
 
ETHICAL PRESSURE 
We have already seen that about half of our respondents agreed that action was sometimes taken 
against legal advice on important matters. Four further questions make up our measure of ethical 
pressure.39 
 ‘How often are you asked to advise on something where the legality of a proposed action by 
the organisation is debatable?’ 
 ‘How often are you asked to advise on something where the ethicality (as opposed to the 
legality) of a proposed action by the organization is debatable?’ 
 ‘I'm sometimes asked to advise or assist on things that make me uncomfortable ethically’; 
and, 
 ‘There are tensions between the way I and the business respects obligations to uphold the 
law.’ 
The individual results are shown in Figure 8 and Figure 9. 
                                               
39
 α= .71 
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Figure 8: Being asked to advise on matters of dubious legality or ethicality 
Around about 10 percent of our respondents were asked to advise on ethically or legally debatable 
actions frequently or very frequently. Over 40 percent were asked to so advise at least sometimes.  
The second pair of questions (Figure 9) relate more to a sense of tension between the judgement of 
the respondent and the decision of the business. Here, about 10-15 percent agreed or strongly 
agreed that they were asked to advise on things that made them uncomfortable, or in ways which 
suggested the business took a different view on whether and/or how to uphold the rule of law and 
about a quarter to a third agreed somewhat or more strongly. 
The extent and nature of these problems raises the very interesting question as to how in-house 
lawyers deal with them. As we will see, the ideas that they have about their role may be important, 
as may their ability and willingness to draw on professional principles. Similarly, the extent to which 
guidance, training, appraisal and discussion of ethics is encouraged and managed for may be 
important. Interestingly, it might have been thought that those in small teams would be more 
vulnerable to ethical pressure and so experience more of it. We did not find this.40 
                                               
40
 There was no correlation between size of team and ethical pressure. 
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Figure 9: Discomfort and tensions around legality/ethicality 
. 
Interestingly, lawyers working in a public sector organisation showed significantly higher ratings of 
ethical pressure than those working in a business.41  
Table 15: Ethical pressure by sector 
 A business Public sector 
organisation 
Charity/social 
enterprise 
ANOVA 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD F p 
Ethical pressure 2.78 .95 3.16 .98 3.19 1.25 6.80 .00 
Statistically significant differences were also found according to the number of years working in-
house, with those working in-house for 0-5 and 6-10 years reporting lower levels of ethical pressure 
than those working in-house for more than 15 years (Table 16). The results from linear regression 
analysis indicates that ethical pressure increases somewhat with seniority and/or experience 
although the strength of the relationship is weak, emphasising the fact that other factors may be at 
play.42 
                                               
41
 α = .002 Whilst pressure in the third sector was also higher, post facto testing did not show this to besignificant. 
42
 β = .018, t = 3.16, p =.002, η
2 
= .02 
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Table 16: Ethical pressure by length of experience working in-house 
 0-5 6-10 11-15 >15 ANOVA 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD F p 
Ethical Pressure 2.80 0.96 2.79 0.92 2.91 0.95 3.19 1.10 3.61 0.01 
SUMMARY – PRESSURES IN THE ORGANISATION 
In broad terms our respondents reported working in organisations where they felt supported 
(although a substantial minority did not).  They also worked in organisations where an unevenness 
of relationship was common and where they were sometimes criticised for being obstructive, and 
(and importantly) where about half agreed that action was sometimes taken against legal advice on 
important matters. More detailed analysis showed: (i) those working in the public sector rated the 
legal department as having more negative/resistant relationships with the employer than those 
working in a business; and (ii) those working in a business felt they had a significantly more 
positive/supportive relationship with the employer, than those working in a charity/social enterprise. 
We also sought to measure ethical pressure: 
 Around about 10 percent of our respondents were asked to advise on ethically or legally 
debatable actions frequently or very frequently. Over 40 percent were asked to so advise on 
such actions at least sometimes.  
 About 10-15 percent agreed or strongly agreed that they were asked to advise on things that 
made them uncomfortable, or in ways which suggested the business took a different view on 
whether and/or how to uphold the rule of law. About a quarter to a third agreed at least 
somewhat with these concerns. Interestingly, lawyers working in a public sector organisation 
showed significantly higher ratings of ethical pressure than those working in a business.  
Our analysis also indicates that ethical pressure increases somewhat with seniority and/or 
experience although the strength of the relationship is weak suggesting the fact that other factors 
may be at play.  
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4 How they conceive of the in-house role 
An issue crucial to our understanding of the in-house lawyer is how they conceive of the role. The 
academic literature has concentrated on the extent to which in-house lawyers are willing to be: cops 
(policing the legality of their organisations); counsellors (advising independently, at one remove 
from the hurly burly of the organisation’s business); or entrepreneurs (actively exploiting 
opportunities presented by uncertainty in the law for business ends).43  The business literature 
similarly reflects on these ideas, whilst also emphasising the growing status and identities of in-
house lawyers as a distinct professional group within the broader legal profession. 44  In this 
literature, ideas of commerciality, efficiency, status and strategic influence dominate.  
In this section of the report we explore in detail the identity and role of our respondents as they saw 
it. 
IDENTITY 
Given the growing numbers and status of in-house lawyers,45 an interesting question is whether in-
house lawyers identify themselves separately from the rest of the legal profession. To shed some 
light on this issue, respondents were asked how they thought of their identity. 
                                               
43
Robert L Nelson and Laura Beth Nielsen, ‘Cops , Counsel , and Entrepreneurs : Constructing the Role of Inside Counsel in Large 
Corporations Author ( S ): Robert L . Nelson and Laura Beth Nielsen Cops , Counsel , and Entrepreneurs : Constructing the Role of Inside 
Counsel in Large Corporations I’ (2012) 34 457.Entrepreneurs: Constructing the Role of Inside Counsel in Large Corporations’ 34(2) Law 
and Society Review 457-494. 
44
 See, for example: Mari Sako, ‘Make or Buy Decisions In Legal Services: A Strategic Perspective’ (Oxford: Said Business School, 
University of Oxford, 2010), 
45
 On status, compare and contrast how in-house lawyers are spoken of in these two pieces: Karl Mackie, Lawyers in Business: and the 
Business of Law (1989 Macmillan); and Ben Heineman, W. The General Counsel as Lawyer-Statesman (Harvard Law School Program 
on the Legal Profession, Blue Paper, 2010). 
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Table 17: How do they think of their identity? 
 n % 
As a solicitor, barrister or advocate (or your own jurisdiction's 
equivalent, e.g. attorney) 
184 45.8 
As an in-house legal adviser (rather than, say, a solicitor or 
barrister) 
161 40 
As a business adviser 18 4.5 
As a manager 10 2.5 
As a subject specialist [e.g. as a trade mark lawyer or a 
competition lawyer or whatever your specialism is] 
14 3.5 
As a business person 14 3.5 
Total 401 99.8 
We can see that there is a reasonably even split between respondents thinking of themselves in 
terms of their professional title and thinking of themselves as an in-house legal adviser or other 
organisational role. This begins to suggest that a sizeable group of in-house lawyers see 
themselves as distinct from solicitors or barristers. An interesting question is whether shifting 
identities change the way they execute their role. Does it, for example, strengthen or weaken their 
ethicality? Might it begin to suggest that in-house lawyers should be seen as a distinct group, with 
their own Code, whatever their background qualification? Mere self-conceptualisation would not 
decide such questions, but it does provide an interesting pointer about occupational and therefore, 
perhaps, professional identity. 
There were significant differences on work identities in different types of organisation:46 public sector 
lawyers were more likely to think of themselves as 'a solicitor, barrister or advocate (or your own 
jurisdiction's equivalent, e.g. attorney)' or as 'a manager' and less likely to think of themselves as 'an 
in-house legal adviser (rather than, say, a solicitor or barrister)' in comparison to those in business 
or in charities/social enterprises (see Figure 10). One hypothesis that might be derived from this is 
that in-house lawyers within commercial organisations are more occupationally distinct.  Another 
would be that the public sector more actively cultivates a traditional professional identity, or it may 
be that some public sector lawyers spend more time in court/litigation type activity and this 
influences their identity. It may also be that those in the public sector spend more of their time 
working on national matters and with stakeholders in the UK (where ‘solicitor or barrister’ has 
greater purchase) compared with those working in commercial organisations where ‘solicitor or 
barrister’ may have less meaning or relevance for large, international organisations, their employees 
and customers. 
                                               
46
 Chi-square, p =.019 
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Figure 10: Occupational identity by sector 
There was some evidence that in-house lawyers further through their career were less likely to think 
of themselves as a solicitor barrister or subject specialist. Those seeing themselves as solicitors or 
barristers (or equivalent) averaged just short of 15 years in practice (private and in-house), whereas 
those who thought of themselves as an in-house legal adviser (mean, 17 years) business adviser 
(mean, 17 years) or a business person (mean, 22 years) were likely to have been in practice longer. 
Conversely, the length of time in-house did not suggest a similar relationship. The identity profiles of 
men and women were very similar. 
ROLE CONCEPTION 
We supplemented the occupational identity question with a much more detailed investigation of how 
our respondents conceived of their role. They were asked, ‘What is your attitude to the following 
statements about the in-house lawyer role?’ and were given 28 attitudinal statements – based on 
our analysis of the literature, and interviews in our own research with in-house lawyers47 - with 
which they could agree or disagree with on a Likert Scale.48 A principal component analysis (PCA) 
was run on these 28 items to identify the core groups of separate ideas emerging from the 28 
questions (see Appendix A). This produces groups of questions (principal components) which 
                                               
47
See: Moorhead and Vaughan (n 29) 
48
 The full breakdown of results is in Appendix A 
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appear to be measuring the same underlying concept. Eight components were extracted, although 
three were excluded as being insufficiently reliable (see Appendix A). The remaining five were 
sufficiently reliable to be included in the analysis. Two of these (ethical orientation and 
independence orientation) had consistency ratings at the borderline of conventional test of reliability 
but we have included them here given the early, experimental nature of this research and the 
importance, and face validity, 49  of the concepts and their individual dimensions. 50  Subsequent 
research should seek to increase the robustness of measures of independence and ethical 
orientations. 
A.COMMERCIAL ORIENTATION 
The first idea defining how our respondents saw the in-house role we describe as a commercial 
orientation.51 The constituent variables can be seen in Figure 11.  
The idea that lawyers need to ‘be commercial’ or have ‘commercial awareness’ takes centre stage 
in many discussions about commercial lawyers, working in-house and in private practice.52 Our data 
suggest that in-house lawyers strongly endorse this as an orientation. Whilst usually seen as a 
virtue in professional discussions, the ethical literature problematises a commercial orientation. 
Framing problems in business terms is suggested to lead to a less ethical approach to problems, for 
example.53 Even quite subtly framing of problems in aspirational, ‘getting the job done’ terms rather 
than a compliance terms has been shown evidenced as having similar effects.54 And at the heart of 
most academic discussion of in-house lawyers is the belief that the needs of the organisation or its 
managers are sometimes in tension with the law or with ethicality which can put a lawyer in an 
uncomfortable position.55  We examine later whether there is evidence within our data to suggest a 
commercial orientation may sometimes lead to ethical problems.  
                                               
49
 The extent to which a test is subjectively viewed as covering the concept it purports to measure 
50
 Cronbach’s alpha tests were conducted. This is a test of internal consistency which indicates how closely the individual elements of a 
group of variables are related to each other. Conventionally, an α> .7 is seen as an acceptable level of reliability. Yes, we can say that: 
Although .70 is the most conventionally used cut-off level for Cronbach alpha measure of reliability, there is no gold standard of 
acceptable or unacceptable level of alpha and in some cases conventionally low levels of alpha are still useful: Schmitt, N. (1996). Uses 
and abuses of coefficient alpha. Psychological Assessment, 8(4), 350-353. As this is the first study to look at in-house lawyer perceptions 
in this way we have included components with an α> .6 where the components make analytical sense.  
51
α =.78 
52
 See, for example, Nelson and Nielsen (n 39) 477 
53
Maryam Kouchaki and others, ‘Seeing Green: Mere Exposure to Money Triggers a Business Decision Frame and Unethical Outcomes’ 
(2013) 121 Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 53. 
54
Francesca Gino and Joshua D Margolis, ‘Bringing Ethics into Focus: How Regulatory Focus and Risk Preferences Influence (Un)ethical 
Behavior’ (2011) 115 Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 145. 
55
 See, for example, Donald C Langevoort, ‘Getting (Too) Comfortable: In-House Lawyers, Enterprise Risk, and the Financial Crisis’ 
[2012] Wis. L. Rev. 495. 
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Figure 11: Dimensions of Commercial Orientation 
 
B. EXPLOITING UNCERTAINTIES ORIENTATION 56 
The second separate idea defining how our respondents saw the in-house role can be described as 
an exploiting uncertainties orientation: here we measure the extent to which lawyers said they 
oriented towards exploiting law’s uncertainty for commercial ends, through the use of loopholes and 
the like.57 The constituent variables can be seen in Figure 12. 
It is a signature of the zealous advocacy model of legal ethics that lawyers can, and perhaps 
should, take advantage of all opportunities available to their clients unless prohibited by law or their 
professional code of conduct.58 This model of ethics is often claimed to be the dominant model. If 
that were so we might see a stronger level of agreement with this orientation in the sample. In fact, 
our in-house lawyers were often resistant to this orientation. That said, over 30 percent of 
respondents were willing to agree, at least somewhat, that loopholes should be identified that 
benefit the business, just below 20 percent similarly agreed that their role was to exploit the law for 
                                               
56
 One of the best known articulations of this view is Stephen L Pepper, ‘The Lawyer’s Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, a Problem, and 
Some Possibilities’, American Bar Foundation Research Journal, 1986, 24;. A more restrained approach is contained in Tim Dare’s, 
‘Mere-Zeal, Hyper-Zeal and the Ethical Obligations of Lawyers Tim Dare’, Legal Ethics 7 (2004): 24–38; William H Simon’s book offers a 
thorough set of counter-arguments, The Practice of Justice: A Theory of Legal Ethics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998). 
57
 α= .74 
58
 For a recent discussion see: Richard Moorhead and Rachel Cahill O’Callaghan, ‘False Friends? Testing Commercial lawyers on the 
claim that Zealous Advocacy is Founded in Benevolence towards Clients rather than Lawyers Personal Interest’ (2016) 19(1) Legal Ethics 
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commercial ends, and almost half agreed that where the law is uncertain, they help the business 
benefit from that uncertainty. 
 
Figure 12: Dimensions of exploiting uncertainty 
 
C. NEUTRAL ADVISOR ORIENTATION 
The third separate idea defining how our respondents saw the in-house role can be described as a 
neutral advisor orientation.  The outlook being articulated here is that the lawyer advises and the 
business decides.59 Along with zeal, the neutral advisor orientation is often seen as part of the 
standard conception of lawyers’ ethics. 60  The idea is that lawyers are able to advise clients 
unencumbered by ethical responsibility for the aims of the client. Legal advice is for the lawyer, and 
any moral decisions about what advice is sought on, and how that advice is used, are for the client. 
To a degree, our neutral adviser orientation aligns with this element of a lawyer’s ethical paradigm.  
It is claimed that this kind of non-accountability allows lawyers to distance themselves 
inappropriately from their own ethical agency.61 A barrister representing a particularly unpopular 
criminal defendant has good reasons for being able to say they should not be associated with their 
client’s misdeeds, but the issues become less clear with more transactional and forward looking 
legal work.  To give an example, a lawyer that creates a tax device that is at the very borders of 
                                               
59
 α= .72 
60
 Pepper (n. 56) 
61
 See, for example, David Luban, Lawyers and Justice : An Ethical Study (Princeton University Press 1988). 
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avoidance/evasion and advises the client of the risks associated with this course of action, cannot in 
all honesty then claim that they bear no moral responsibility for the adoption of the device by the 
client.  
We identified two variables consistent with the neutral advisor orientation which are shown in Figure 
13. We can see that our sample of in-house lawyers often agreed with this orientation, although – 
interestingly –less strongly than a commercial orientation. 
 
Figure 13: Dimensions of the neutral advisor orientation 
 
 
D. ETHICAL ORIENTATION 
The fourth separate idea defining how our respondents saw the in-house role can be described as 
an ethical orientation.62 Its constituent dimensions are shown in Figure 14. The place of an ethical 
orientation in the classical literature on lawyers’ ethics is perhaps most strongly suggested by the 
idea of lawyer as wise counsel. 63  We see something of that idea in these dimensions – an 
orientation towards a degree of ethical leadership and being influenced by ethical considerations. 
                                               
62
 α= .66 
63
Anthony Kronman, The Lost Lawyer : Failing Ideals of the Legal Profession (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 1995). 
Heinemann’s work from the perspective of his experience as a leading GC, speaks to some similar themes. See, for example, Jr Ben W. 
Heineman, The Inside Counsel Revolution: Resolving the Partner-Guardian Tension (Ankerwycke 2016).     
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Figure 14: Dimensions of ethical orientation 
 
 
E.INDEPENDENCE ORIENTATION 
The fifth separate idea defining how our respondents saw the in-house role can be described as an 
independence orientation. Independence is a professional principle recognised in the courts.64 Our 
measure is based on two variables which confine an independence orientation to agreeing that 
there needs to be an understanding between the employer and the lawyer on the lawyer’s 
independence and that that independence is important to the lawyer (Figure 15).65 
                                               
64
 See, for example, in the context of criminal defence R. v Farooqi & Ors, [2013] EWCA Crim 1649 (30 September 2013) and this 
discussion, Richard Moorhead, ‘Court of Appeal Criticism of Advocate Extends beyond the Man Himself’ 
<http://lawyerwatch.wordpress.com/2013/10/02/court-of-appeal-criticism-of-advocate-extends-beyond-the-man-himself/> accessed 8 
March 2014. 
65
α = .61 
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Figure 15: Dimensions of the independence orientation 
 
F. OTHER INFLUENCES 
A number of other questions did not group together as orientations but may nonetheless provide 
important insight into how in-house lawyers see their role. These are shown in Figure 17. 
SAYING ‘NO’ 
An element of the literature that has interested academics, and interests in-housers too, is the 
willingness of in-house lawyers to say ‘No’ in situations where potentially unlawful or unethical 
conduct is proposed. The willingness to say ‘No’ is part of the ‘Cops’ conception of the in-house 
lawyer: that in-house lawyers can and should act as gate-keepers restraining illegality within the 
organisation.66 Our previous work on ethics and risk suggested that the gate-keeping role was in 
tension with in-housers establishing trust and a role influencing the business. 67  Almost all (97 
percent) of our sample agreed that insisting something cannot be done within the law is sometimes 
necessary (2 percent disagreed) and 88 percent agreed that they might do more than just refuse to 
act if their organisation insisted on an illegal course of action (5 percent disagreed).68 Conversely, 9 
percent of our respondents agreed that saying ‘No’ to the organisation is to be avoided, even when 
there is no legally acceptable alternative to suggest (86 percent disagreed). 
 
                                               
66
 Nelson and Nielsen (n 34) 
67
 Moorhead and Vaughan (n 32). 
68
 We see as implying escalation of the problem within the organisation and/or resignation but it might also include whistleblowing or other 
responses. 
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SPIRIT OF THE LAW AND REPUTATION 
Beyond the ethical orientation discussed above, we can see also that nearly all (98 percent) of our 
respondents agreed that their advice went beyond legal considerations to consider reputational 
aspects (1 percent disagreed). Similarly, 97 percent agreed that their advice encompasses both the 
letter and the spirit of the law (1 percent disagreed). Interestingly, when considering whether the 
organisation‘s decisions were determined by the purpose and not just the letter of the law, 
agreement weakened somewhat, but was still strong: 82 percent agreed and 8 percent disagreed 
that decisions were so determined. 
OTHER ISSUES AROUND A COMMERCIAL ORIENTATION 
We could see the commercial orientation being supported by an approach to the job which saw 
legal as a form of risk management. In total, 81 percent agreed with the idea that their job is to help 
set appetite for risk within legal bounds (10 percent disagreed) and 77 percent agreed that their job 
is to manage to a known risk appetite (11 percent disagreed). Importantly though, whilst 65 percent 
agreed that achieving what their organisation wants has to be their main priority, nearly a quarter 
(23 percent) disagreed.  
As we might expect, the position is nuanced: 71 percent agreed that sometimes it’s necessary to 
think less about the organisation’s needs and more about what the law requires, whereas 17 
percent disagreed. The body of evidence that points to the potential detriment of overly emphasising 
commercial ends is supported, to an extent, by 30 percent agreeing that an emphasis on 
commercial awareness sometimes inhibits the in-house lawyer in performing his or her role, whilst 
57 percent disagreed. 
INDEPENDENCE, NEUTRAL ADVISOR AND ETHICAL ORIENTATIONS 
Our data suggests that an independence orientation is quite strong in our group of respondents, but 
also that businesses sometimes take decisions that are at odds with the lawyer’s view of the law or 
the ethicality of the situation. The neutral advisor orientation provides a rationale for justifying any 
snub to their independent view. The weight given to independence might matter; so, 74 percent of 
our respondents agreed that it is important to them that the business agrees with their opinion on 
the legality of proposed actions, whereas 14 percent disagreed. Perhaps surprisingly, as many as 
12 percent agreed that where commercial desirability and legal professional judgement are in 
tension, commercial desirability is more important, suggesting independence was not strong within 
the 12 percent. However 69 percent disagreed. 
Consistent with the neutral advisor position and somewhat inconsistent with the ethical orientation 
would be the 22 percent who agreed that others in the organisation are responsible for considering 
the ethics of the organisation’s decisions; their role is to advise on the law (a position rejected by 71 
percent). 
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Figure 16: Other elements of role identity 
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SUBSERVIENCE NOT INDEPENDENCE? 
We have begun to see in the data a minority group that appeared to agree with a less independent 
or more subservient role. This was supported somewhat by our principal components analysis 
which suggested that where respondents tended towards disagreeing with the idea that commercial 
awareness sometimes inhibits the in-house lawyer in performing his or her role, they tended to 
agree more with the ideas that: (i) others in the organization are responsible for considering the 
ethics of its decisions, their role is to advise on the law; (ii) that saying ‘No’ to the organisation is to 
be avoided, even when there is no legally acceptable alternative to suggest; and (iii) where 
commercial desirability and legal professional judgement are in tension, commercial desirability is 
more important. The level of commonality was not strong enough for us to see these as measuring 
subservience as one underlying construct,69  but it is illustrative of the potential difficulties with 
allowing a commercial and neutral advisor orientations to become unbalanced. 
A CLOSER LOOK AT ORIENTATIONS 
Composite scales were developed from the principal components identified above so that we can 
step back from the detail and get a stronger sense of the overall picture. We can get a comparison 
of how strongly in-house lawyers identified with each of the components by comparing the 
distributions of each scale.  
In Figure 17 the thin vertical lines represent the top and bottom 25 percent of each distribution and 
the boxes represent the middle 50 percent. Where there is no vertical line, the box represents 75 
percent. So, we can see that 75 percent have very high levels of agreement with a commercial 
orientation. Ethical orientation was the next strongest. Independence the third and neutral advisor 
the fourth. The exploit uncertainty orientation was the one which prompted the widest spread of 
agreement-disagreement, with the centre of gravity of the group being just towards disagreeing with 
the idea that this was part of their role. 
                                               
69
 α = .56 
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Figure 17: In-house role orientations 
 
We can also compare the scores on these components by organisation type (Table 18). In the table 
7 = strongly agree and 1 = strongly disagree. 
Table 18: Orientations by organisation type 
 A business Public sector 
organisation 
Charity/social 
enterprise 
ANOVA 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD F p 
Commercial  6.58 0.44 5.68 0.88 6.16 0.81 79.01 .00 
Ethical 6.08 0.74 5.73 0.84 5.97 0.89 7.63 .00 
Independence  5.94 0.93 6.08 0.91 5.86 1.16 0.99 0.37 
Neutral advisor 5.39 1.29 5.7 0.93 5.57 1.23 2.42 0.09 
Exploit uncertainty 3.9 1.19 3.52 1.18 3.62 1.18 4.10 0.02 
 
Our analysis of variance (ANOVA) found significant differences between lawyers working in different 
organisation types (i.e., business, public sector, charity) regarding commercial, ethical, and exploit 
uncertainty orientations. 70  However, no differences were found for independence and neutral 
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 A statistical test used to determine whether there are any significant differences between the means of three or more independent 
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advisor orientations between lawyers working in different organisation types. More detailed 
comparisons showed statistically significant differences across the following groups as follows:71 
 Lawyers working in a business showed the highest commercial orientation, followed by 
those working in charities/social enterprises and those working in the public sector. 
 Ethical orientation was significantly higher amongst those working in business compared 
with those working in the public sector. 
 Although most respondents did not have an exploit uncertainty orientation, those working in 
a business environment showed more agreement with the exploit uncertainty approach than 
those working in the public sector. 
Whilst it is important to know in absolute terms whether someone agrees or disagrees with an 
orientation, it may be also be important to know the relative importance of each orientation to an 
individual. Someone might tend to rate both commerciality and ethicality highly, but which is most 
highly rated by them, for instance? Another way of thinking about this is: if a decision poses a 
conflict between one or more orientations, which is likely to be the most influential? 
If we look at the effective ranking of each orientation by each respondent,72we can see that a 
commercial orientation was in the top two for almost three quarters of respondents. Independence 
was the next most highly ranked orientations with it ranking in the top two for just over half of our 
respondents. An ethical orientation was similar but slightly less highly ranked. 
 
Figure 18: Ranking of orientations (1
st
 = strongest agreement, 5
th
 = weakest agreement) 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
(unrelated) groups. 
71
 Post hoc comparisons were conducted, statistical significance is recorded at conventional levels p <= .05 
72
 Respondents were not asked to rank each orientation. We have derived rankings from the strength of agreement they indicated with 
each of the statements making up our components. 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Commercial Independence Ethical Advisory Exploit uncertainty
5th
4th
3rd
2nd
1st
 
Ethical Leadership for In-House Lawyers  
49 | P a g e  
 
 
We also analysed the rankings by organisation type: 
 Nearly all in-house lawyers working in a business had commercial orientation as the first (66 
percent of them) or second (21 percent of them) strongest orientation. In the third sector, 48 
percent ranked it first and 24 percent second. In the public sector 23 percent ranked it first 
and 21 percent second. 
 An independence orientation was ranked as the top orientation for 53 percent of public 
sector in-house lawyers and second for 20 percent. The figures were 24 percent and 25 
percent for those in the third sector, and 34 percent and 14 percent in the business sector. 
 An ethical orientation was strongest in the third sector, where 35 percent ranked it first and 
21 percent second. 25 percent ranked it first and 25 percent second in the public sector, and 
25 percent first and 22 percent second in the business sector. 
 A neutral advisor orientation was first ranked for 28 percent of third sector lawyers and 
second for 14 percent. The figures for public sector lawyers were 23 percent and 26 percent 
respectively. Indeed, it was the third or higher orientation for three quarters of public sector 
in-house lawyers (but similarly rated for only 50 percent of business lawyers and 48 percent 
of third sector lawyers). 
 An exploiting uncertainty orientation was generally lowly ranked, though slightly less so for 
business lawyers. For 67 percent of business in-house lawyers this was ranked in their 
bottom two orientations. The figure was 83 percent in the public sector and the third sector. 
Interestingly, for six in-house lawyers in business this was in the top two strongest 
orientations. 
From this data we get a strong sense of the diversity of orientations within our sample of in-house 
lawyers. The strongest consensus was around a commercial orientation – most of the business 
lawyers saw this as a strong orientation in absolute terms (they strongly agreed with it) and in 
relative terms (they tended to rank this orientation highly). Public sector lawyers tended to agree 
most strongly with an independence orientation. Third sector lawyers, consistent with their 
organisational mission presumably, put a somewhat greater relative emphasis on an ethical 
orientation.  
It is interesting to see, too, the somewhat stronger level of agreement with commercial, ethical and 
independence orientations over a neutral advisor orientation. It is not that our sample did not 
generally agree that the in-house lawyer advises and the client decides (they did), but rather they 
emphasised orientations which saw a stronger emphasis on their own agency. That is, they were 
more strongly in agreement with a role which saw themselves as influencers towards commerciality 
and/or ethicality and for that influence to be exercised from a position of some independence, than 
they were to distance themselves from difficult decisions by saying the client (and not them) is 
responsible. This is an important signal of maturity in the majority of approaches. In-house lawyers, 
whilst they might sometimes call on the language and values of non-accountability, do not really see 
themselves as neutral, non-accountable advisors as strongly as they see themselves as commercial 
or ethical agents (i.e. as people with some form of commercial or ethical role to play). 
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SUMMARY – HOW IN-HOUSE LAWYERS CONCEIVE OF THEIR ROLE 
Our respondents split reasonably evenly between respondents thinking of themselves in terms of 
their professional title and thinking of themselves as an in-house legal adviser or other 
organisational role. This begins to suggest that a sizeable group of in-house lawyers see 
themselves as somehow distinct from solicitors or barristers. Public sector lawyers were more likely 
to think of themselves as a solicitor, barrister or advocate than those in business or in 
charities/social enterprises. We might hypothesize that in-house lawyers within commercial 
organisations are more occupationally distinct, and/or that the public sector more actively cultivates 
a conventional professional identity, and/or it may be that some public sector lawyers spend more 
time in court/litigation type activity and this influences their identity. The geographic spread of the 
organisation and the extent to which those in the organisation (and its customers) recognise the 
titles of solicitor and barrister may also have purchase.  
Our particular interest was in how in-house lawyers conceived of their role. From a range of 
questions we isolated five orientations: 
 a commercial orientation (our data supported the view that lawyers frame their role strongly 
in terms of the needs of the organisation they work for); 
 an exploiting uncertainties orientation (supported by a significant minority of our 
respondents); 
 an ethical orientation (generally supported);  
 an independence orientation (generally supported); and, 
 a neutral advisor orientation (agreed with by most of our respondents, if less strongly than 
the ethical and independence orientations). 
Our profiling also looks at other issues such as appetite for saying ‘No’ (the vast majority said they 
were willing to do this and back it up with further action if necessary, yet 9 percent indicated that 
saying ‘No’ to the organisation was to be avoided, even when there is no legally acceptable 
alternative to suggest). Most advised, they said, in the spirit of the law (and also said that their 
organisations were guided by this when deciding). We can get a sense of the emphasis to be 
placed on a commercial orientation from the 65 percent that agreed that achieving what their 
organisation wants has to be their main priority; although nearly a quarter (23 percent) disagreed. 
Academic concerns about over-emphasising commercial awareness are given some support by the 
30 percent of our sample agreeing that an emphasis on commercial awareness sometimes inhibits 
the in-house lawyer in performing his or her role, whilst 57 percent disagreed. Furthermore, perhaps 
surprisingly, 12 percent agreed that where commercial desirability and legal professional judgement 
are in tension, commercial desirability is more important. 
There were differences across sectors. Lawyers working in a business showed the highest 
commercial and ethical orientations in absolute terms. They also showed the highest exploit 
uncertainty orientation. If we look more at relative ranking of orientations we can see that lawyers 
working in a business were particularly likely to rank commercial orientation as the strongest 
orientations (in their top two); whereas, public sector lawyers emphasised an independence 
orientation more strongly and third sector lawyers emphasised an ethical orientation. 
It is interesting to see, too, the somewhat stronger level of agreement with commercial, ethical and 
independence orientations over a neutral advisor orientation. It is not that our sample did not 
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generally agree that the in-house lawyer advises and the client decides (they did), but rather that 
they emphasised orientations which saw a stronger emphasis on their own agency. That is, they 
were more strongly in agreement with a role which saw themselves as influencers towards 
commerciality and/or ethicality and for that influence to be exercised from a position of some 
independence, than they were to distance themselves from difficult decisions by saying the client 
not them, is responsible. We see this is an important signal of maturity in the majority of approaches 
adopted by our respondents. 
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5 Team Orientation 
Much of the work on ethics emphasises that context and culture are critical influences on ethicality. 
We have already considered relations with the business and ethical pressure. In this section we 
look at team orientation. Respondents were asked to ‘Indicate the overall orientation of [their] team 
by rating the extent to which the following subjects are a topic of conversation for them’. This 
approach reflects how respondents assessed their teams, not what the teams themselves thought. 
A risk is that respondents saw teams through their own perspectives. So, an ethically oriented 
respondent might be more likely to see their teams as ethical (of course the opposite is also 
possible depending on how happy they were with their team). We guarded against this to a degree 
by asking the respondents to reflect on team behaviours rather than on something more nebulous. 
A principal component analysis identified four distinct components with acceptable or good reliability 
from this list of statements (see Appendix A). 
A. ETHICAL ORIENTATION 
An ethical team orientation had three dimensions.73 Most (70-75 percent) of respondents indicated 
their teams regularly or very frequently discussed: ‘doing the right thing’, ‘treating people fairly’ and 
‘valuing integrity as much as profits’. Very few were willing to say they rarely or never discussed 
such matters (Figure 19). 
                                               
73
 α= .73 
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Figure 19: Team orientation - ethical 
B. PRODUCTIVITYAND STRATEGY AND C. FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 
A second component was performance and productivity.74 This consisted of strategy and planning 
and productivity and efficiency. A financial performance orientation was measured based on 
discussions about financial performance and shareholder/investor interests. 75 
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Figure 20: Team orientation – productivity and strategy 
We can see from Figure 20 that strategy, productivity and finance were more frequently discussed 
than more ethical matters, with the exception of shareholders and investor interests, which a 
substantial minority said they never discussed.76 
D. SOCIETY ORIENTATION 
A societal orientation was based on teams discussing two questions:77 
 Seeking the good of society 
 The organisation’s role in society 
 
Figure 21: Team orientation - societal 
 
Here our respondents split more evenly between those who said they discussed this regularly and 
those who are more equivocal, doing so only sometimes or rarely. 
When looking across the sectors at team orientation, significant differences were found between 
lawyers working in different organisation types (i.e., business, public sector, charity) regarding their 
ratings of the different team orientations (ethical, financial performance, productivity and strategy, 
and society). 
                                               
76
 Although these were often public or third sector organisations, even in business organisations about 20% discussed shareholder and 
investor interests rarely or never. 
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Table 19: Team orientation by sector 
 A business Public sector 
organisation 
Charity/social 
enterprise 
ANOVA 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD F p 
Ethical orientation 3.91 0.75 4.09 0.72 4.25 0.62 4.38 .01 
Financial performance 3.78 0.85 2.57 0.86 2.81 0.81 80.08 .00 
Society Orientation 2.90 0.90 3.89 0.82 4.36 0.68 72.73 .00 
Productivity and Strategy 4.13 0.70 3.87 0.79 3.88 0.68 5.56 .00 
  
We can see that teams working in commercial organisations were most oriented towards 
productivity and strategy. Public sector lawyer teams emphasised ethicality most strongly followed 
by society and productivity/strategy. Charity/social enterprise lawyers emphasised society most 
strongly. More detailed analysis showed several statistically significant differences:78 
 Those working in a charity/social enterprise rated their team as having greater ethical 
orientation than those working in a business.  
 Those working in a business rated their team as having greater financial performance 
orientation than those working in either the public sector or in a charity /social enterprise. 
 Those working in a charity/ social enterprise showing higher ratings of their team’s society 
orientation, followed by those working in the public sector, and finally those working in a 
business. 
 Those working in a business rated their team as having greater productivity and strategy 
orientation than those working in the public sector.  
Principals 
SUMMARY – TEAM ORIENTATION 
Our analysis of team orientation suggested four components: an ethical orientation; a performance 
and productivity orientation; a financial orientation; and, a society orientation. 
Teams working in commercial organisations were most oriented towards productivity and strategy. 
Public sector lawyer teams emphasised ethicality most strongly followed by society and 
productivity/strategy. Charity/social enterprise lawyers emphasised society most.  
Principals 
  
                                               
78
 p < .05 
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6 Professional principles 
A key question for in-house lawyers is the extent to which they are meaningfully professional in their 
approach. Part of the answer to that question has to engage with a consideration of their 
employment of professional principles. Our previous work has suggested that the role of 
professional principles in the work of the in-house lawyer is muted, with public interest principles 
taking a back seat to the idea of putting the client first.79 We sought to explore the nature of any role 
more quantitatively in this study. 
Respondents were asked: ‘To what extent do the following obligations have an important influence 
on you in practice?’ The principles required under the SRA code were then listed.80 We did not label 
them as professional principles to minimise response bias associated with being explicitly reminded 
these were mandatory.  
Three components were extracted from the nine principles used using principal component analysis 
(see Appendix A), suggesting practitioners tended to treat the principles in three distinct groups: one 
group we have called ‘public trust and legality obligations’, because the principles relate to 
obligations the lawyer owes other than to the client, to independence and legality. A second set we 
call ‘effective service and integrity obligations’ – it included acting with integrity and providing a 
proper standard of service to the organisation – and was focused on how services are delivered to 
the client. The third component was a single criterion, the ‘best interest of the client’, suggesting – 
interestingly - that respondents treated this principle separately from the other two groups of 
principles.  
A. INDEPENDENCE AND LEGALITY 
Here we see the more public facing of the professional principles being clustered together by the 
respondents, with independence also included.81  Whilst all the principles here are regularly or 
frequently influential according to our respondents, it is noticeable that within this group of principles 
it is the influence of legal and regulatory obligations on them as lawyers that appears slightly 
stronger.  
As we will see, the influence of these public trust and legality principles is not as strong as the other 
two clusters. 
                                               
79
Moorhead and Vaughan (n 32); Richard Moorhead and Victoria Hinchly, ‘Professional Minimalism? The Ethical Consciousness of 
Commercial Lawyers’ (2015) 42 Journal of Law and Society 387. 
80
 Most of our respondents were expected to be (and were) solicitors, hence we decided to use the solicitors’ principles. Broadly similar 
duties are in the code of conduct for barristers. 
81
α= .81 
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Figure 22: Professional principles - independence and legality 
 
B. EFFECTIVE SERVICEAND INTEGRITY 
Here we see three of the professional principles related to effective service for the client being 
clustered together by the respondents, but the ‘best interest of the client’ was not included in this 
component. 82  This suggests that our respondents dealt with the best interest principle in a 
somewhat different way than the effective service and integrity principles. When compared with the 
independence and legality principles, what is noticeable immediately is the even greater agreement 
that these effective service principles are at least sometimes influential, and the higher incidence of 
our respondents saying they are very frequently influential. 
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Figure 23: Professional principles – proper service 
 
C. CLIENT’S INTERESTS 
This left the ‘best interest of the client’ (or, as we phrased it in the survey, the best interest of the 
organisation) as a third component in the analysis. Again, respondents indicated this was almost 
always at least sometimes influential. They were somewhat less likely to see the client’s interests as 
being very frequently influential than they were for the effectiveness and integrity principles, but it 
was still very frequently influential for a majority of respondents. This was something of a contrast 
with the legality and independence principles.  
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Figure 24: Professional principles - best interest of the organisation 
 
Significant differences were found between lawyers working in different organisation types (i.e., 
business, public sector, charity) regarding their ratings of the professional principles of 
‘Independence and legality’ (Table 20). ‘Independence and Legality’ was applied significantly more 
frequently by those working in the public sector than by those working in a business. No significant 
differences were found regarding the principles of ‘Effectiveness and Integrity’ and ‘Clients 
interests’. 
Table 20: Professional principles usage by sector 
 A business Public sector 
organisation 
Charity/social 
enterprise 
ANOVA 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD F p 
Independence and Legality 3.88 0.76 4.30 0.66 4.00 0.86 11.54 .00 
Effectiveness and Integrity 4.67 0.43 4.64 0.44 4.62 0.48 0,41 .67 
Client Interests 4.54 0.56 4.44 0.64 4.66 0.48 1.82 .16 
All groups put the least emphasis on independence and legality overall, but only the charity/social 
enterprise lawyers said they applied the clients’ interests’ principles more often than effectiveness 
and integrity (and then only marginally so).  
In some ways this takes us a bit further on the subtle view of in-house lawyer agency that we saw 
when looking at orientations to the role. Effectiveness and integrity principles are apparently the 
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most influential, alongside client interests. One interpretation is that our respondents retain a sense 
of their own integrity, and the importance of that as part of an ethical orientation, but that the 
strongest contextual influences are about being effective and serving the client’s needs. A more 
emphatic independence is not coming out through their application of the professional principles – 
although independence and legality principles were more influential for public sector lawyers where 
ideas about the rule of law being in tension with the dictates of political masters may be stronger. 
This stronger emphasis may also reflect a strong culture of independence within the government 
legal service, a greater sensitivity to threats to that independence and/or a more pragmatic 
response to the risk that decisions for their employers would be scrutinised by judicial review.83 It 
may also reflect the wider culture of the civil service and the need for civil servants to be impartial 
and objective in their work.  
The stronger role of client/effectiveness principles is also interesting because, whilst the 
professional principles support acting in the best interests of the client, where that principle conflicts 
with others (notably, for the sake of this argument, upholding the rule of law and the administration 
of justice) then the SRA guidance on the principles for solicitors indicates that it is the principle 
which best serves the public interest, and especially the public interest in the administration of 
justice, that takes precedence.84 The Bar’s Code has similar requirements. Does the frequency with 
which client interests are emphasised suggest a resistance to, or lack of awareness of, the pre-
eminence of the public interest in the rule of law? There are a number of ways of interpreting the 
data here: one is that rule of law type concerns simply surface less often. Another is that the rule of 
law and administration of justice principle is less well known, less well understood, and/or has less 
practical traction. A third is that any ‘ethical orientation’ is more likely to be seen through an integrity 
rather than a public interest/rule of law lens and more frequently through a client’s best interest lens. 
Overall we see diverse interpretations of which principles are prioritised and this is somewhat at 
odds with how the SRA (and the BSB) defines solicitor (and barrister) obligations.  
What the findings do not support is the view that in-house lawyers are not influenced by 
professional principles in their everyday decision making. 85  Our respondents said they were 
influenced by their professional principles, although this may reflect a reaction to being presented 
with a list of obligations which are, in the abstract, uncontroversial. The findings do support the view 
that client facing obligations tend to be prioritised over public interest considerations but so also 
does integrity. The treatment of legality and public interest concerns as the least called upon of the 
professional principles is evidence that the in-house legal community surveyed here may have a 
misapprehension of its professional obligations. Where there is a conflict between principles, 
barristers and solicitors are supposed to put the public interest in the administration of justice first, 
not last. 
                                               
83
Shelagh Campbell, ‘Exercising Discretion in the Context of Dependent Employment: Assessing the Impact of Workload on the Rule of 
Law’ (2015). See, also the interview referred to in Bowie (n 30). 
84
 SRA, ‘Handbook – The Principles’ (Version 15), para 2.2. This says: “Where two or more Principles come into conflict, the Principle 
which takes precedence is the one which best serves the public interest in the particular circumstances, especially the public interest in 
the proper administration of justice.” 
85
 Our qualitative work tends to suggest such influence is modest, Moorhead and Hinchly (n 79); Moorhead and Vaughan (n 32). 
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SUMMARY – PROFESSIONAL PRINCIPLES 
This chapter looks at the relative influence of the main professional principles as a way of 
understanding, in broad terms, how our respondents conceptualised their professional 
responsibilities. Our respondents tended to treat certain of the principles (what we call principles of 
independence and legality) similarly. They also tended to treat a set of principles around what we 
called integrity and effectiveness similarly. They also tended to treat the final remaining principle, 
the best interests of the client, separately from these two other groups.  
As we expected from our prior work, but contrary to the way in which the professional codes 
prioritises the principles, we saw the best interest of the client, and then principles of integrity and 
effectiveness as being the most influential on our respondents. Whilst all groups tended to suggest 
‘Independence and Legality’ was the least influential, it was applied significantly more frequently by 
those working in the public sector than by those working in a business. 
In some ways this takes us a bit further on the subtle view of in-house lawyer agency that we saw 
when looking at orientations to the role. Effectiveness and integrity principles are apparently the 
most influential, alongside client interests. One interpretation is that our respondents retain a sense 
of their own integrity, and the importance of that as part of an ethical orientation, but that the 
strongest contextual influences are about being effective and serving the client’s needs.  
The stronger role of client/effectiveness principles is also interesting because, whilst the 
professional principles support acting in the best interests of the client, where that principle conflicts 
with others (notably, for the sake of this argument, upholding the rule of law and the administration 
of justice) then the SRA guidance on the principles for solicitors indicates that it is the principle 
which best serves the public interest, and especially the public interest in the administration of 
justice in particular, that takes precedence.86 
What the findings do not support is the view that in-house lawyers are not influenced by 
professional principles in their everyday decision making. 87  Our respondents said they were 
influenced by professional principles, although this may reflect a reaction to being presented with a 
list of obligations which are, in the abstract, uncontroversial. The findings do support the view that 
clients facing obligations tend to be more influential than public interest considerations but so, also, 
does integrity and effectiveness. The treatment of legality and public interest concerns as the least 
called upon of the professional principles is evidence that the in-house legal community surveyed 
here may have a misapprehension of its professional obligations. Where there is a conflict between 
principles, barristers and solicitors are supposed to put the public interest in the administration of 
justice first, not last. 
  
                                               
86
 SRA, ‘Handbook – The Principles’ (Version 15), para 2.2. This says: “Where two or more Principles come into conflict, the Principle 
which takes precedence is the one which best serves the public interest in the particular circumstances, especially the public interest in 
the proper administration of justice.” 
87
 Our qualitative work tends to suggest such influence is modest, Moorhead and Hinchly (n 79); Moorhead and Vaughan (n 32). 
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7 Professional Ethical Infrastructure 
With ethical pressure a feature of practice for a significant number of our respondents, the way in 
which ethical challenges are managed is emphasised in importance.  The business literature 
explores the importance of an infrastructure which protects and promotes ethicality but it is not 
something much explored within the legal field.88 A question of some interest to us is therefore 
respondents’ views on ethical infrastructure. Respondents were asked:  ‘Other than through the 
professional Code(s) that apply to you as a lawyer, are professional legal obligations (i.e. your 
obligations as a lawyer) implemented through…’ and they were then given a number of options, 
discussed below, to indicate the frequency with which such means were used. For some methods it 
was not appropriate to ask a frequency question: for example, 55 percent of respondents indicated 
that Corporate Codes were one route, but it did not make sense to ask how frequently a Corporate 
Code implemented professional legal obligations.89 
Again, principal component analysis was used to simplify the data (see Appendix A). Two 
components were found to the remaining questions about ethical infrastructure – formal and 
informal infrastructure. 
FORMAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
Training and written guidance is one means by which we might expect professional obligations to be 
implemented, which we describe as formal infrastructure.90 
                                               
88
Linda K Treviño, Gary R Weaver and Scott J Reynolds, ‘Behavioral Ethics in Organizations: A Review’ (2006) 32 Journal of 
Management 951; Gino and Margolis (n 54).  For an exception in law, see Elizabeth Chambliss and David B Wilkins, ‘Promoting Effective 
Ethical Infrastructure in Large Law Firms: A Call for Research and Reporting’ (2001) 30 Hofstra L. Rev. 691. 
89
 This was indicated on yes or no basis and so was analysed separately. 
90
 α= .70 
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Figure 25: Professional ethical infrastructure - formal 
 
One striking indication in Figure 25 is the high proportion of respondents indicating there was no 
formal infrastructure, or that where guidance is issued or training takes place this happens only 
every few years. In these terms, professional ethics looks like a low priority, not much supported by 
these processes. The incidence of ethical pressure underlines the importance of this finding. If 
significant minorities of in-house lawyers experienced pressure to advise on unlawful or unethical 
activities then we might expect to see greater emphasis on training and guidance to cope with these 
pressures. We do not.91 
Let us turn then to informal infrastructure. This was made up of three elements.92 
 
                                               
91
 Similarly we found no correlation between levels of ethical pressure and formal ethical infrastructure. High pressure did not appear to 
prompt improved formal infrastructure. 
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Figure 26: Informal infrastructure 
Whilst the figures do not appear to be as bad for informal infrastructure, one might expect informal 
interactions around ethics to be more frequent than formal interactions. It is again noticeable that 
communication, even informally, around professional ethical issues is infrequent and for some does 
not occur at all, unless ethical discussions are taking place without the respondents framing them in 
terms of ‘ethics’. Indeed, 7 percent of respondents indicated ‘not at all’ to all six questions indicating 
that they never discussed professional ethics issues with colleagues internally or externally, formally 
or informally. 
Again, we emphasise that we would expect to see in-house lawyers faced with ethical pressure 
develop a stronger informal ethical infrastructure. We see some signs of a relationship between 
ethical pressure and informal ethical infrastructure, pressure may be prompting more informal 
discussion, but there is only a weak correlation.93  
Lawyers working in different organisation types (i.e., business, public sector, charity) showed 
significant differences regarding their ratings of formal ethical structure – but not regarding the 
informal ethical structure. Those working in a business showed higher ratings of formal ethical 
structure than those working in a charity/social enterprise. 
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Table 21: Ethical infrastructure by organisation 
 A business Public sector 
organisation 
Charity/ 
social 
enterprise 
ANOVA 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD F p 
Formal infrastructure 2.63 1.30 2.64 1.51 2.00 1.08 2.93 .05 
Informal infrastructure 3.48 1.49 3.59 1.58 4.11 1.49 2.27 .10 
 
We also wanted to know whether teams had reviewed professional codes (e.g. found in the SRA 
and BSB Handbooks) and documented a response to them. Agreement that this had been done 
was weak (although agreement was slightly more likely in larger teams). Nearly a third (29 percent) 
agreed, and 12 percent only somewhat, that they had done this. Half (50 percent) disagreed (again 
12 percent only somewhat).  
Fifty-six percent agreed that assessment of an in-house lawyers ethics forms an explicit and formal 
part of performance appraisals (14 percent only somewhat). Twenty-two percent disagreed (8 
percent somewhat). The extent and nature of such appraisals is something that we are investigating 
further in follow-on interviews with in-house lawyers.  
 
ATTITUDES TO REGULATION 
An interesting counterpoint to informal and formal infrastructure within in-house teams is the role of 
external regulation. We have seen the respondents state that they attached some importance to 
lawyers adhering to their legal and regulatory obligations. We also surmise, based on work we have 
conducted elsewhere, that one reason ethical infrastructure is given a low priority (beyond pressure 
of work), is the belief that lawyers’ ethics is maintained by recruiting the ‘right kinds of people’ who 
come already trained (principally through the LPC and BPTC) in their professional obligations.94 
Similarly, low levels of translation of the SRA and BSB codes into internal guidance or other 
documents may indicate a satisfaction with the content of the code. We explore that in this section. 
We tested attitude to regulation with nine questions.95 Principal component analyses suggested four 
components, although only one of these had reasonable levels of reliability, the first one: ‘Codes 
could be more useful’, which consisted of the following two variables.96  
A large majority of our respondents felt the professional codes of conduct should be more useful 
and should include more rules and guidance about their roles and responsibilities. 
                                               
94
Moorhead and Hinchly (n 79).  
95
 One question (about the relevance of the Bar’s Code of Conduct) was excluded because most respondents neither agreed nor 
disagreed with the statement (reflecting the majority of our respondents being solicitors). 
96
α= .73 
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Figure 27: Codes could be more useful 
The next questions dealt with whether the respondents felt like there was too much or not enough 
regulation.97 
 
Figure 28: Is there enough regulation of in-house lawyers? 
Whilst the tendency of our cohort of in-house lawyers was to disagree with the statement, many of 
our respondents neither agreed nor disagreed. Perhaps asking about the volume of regulation is not 
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the most helpful question unless, as seems unlikely given the other answers in this section, they 
thought, like a lawyerly Goldilocks, the level of regulation was just right. 
Our next two questions dealt with the extent to which respondents claimed that the regulatory codes 
of conduct were actually used in practice. One of these questions we have already discussed above 
in the context of ethical infrastructure but it seemed appropriate also to consider it here:98 
 
Figure 29: Utility of codes 
In spite of the low levels of ethical discussion and training, a majority our respondents indicate that 
the codes have a material day to day impact. These two bits of data are difficult to reconcile: our 
own dealings with in-house lawyers lead us to suspect the impact of the Code is not generally 
material day to day.  Finally we asked whether the Solicitors’ Code of Conduct addresses the needs 
of in-house lawyers well. More disagreed than agreed. 
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Figure 30: Code addresses need of in-house lawyers 
 
 
 
SUMMARY – ETHICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
This chapter examined the level of formal and informal professional ethical infrastructure within our 
respondents’ organisations. 
Formal infrastructure looked at training and written guidance. A high proportion of respondents 
indicated in essence that there was no formal infrastructure, or that where guidance is issued or 
training takes place that this occurs only every few years. In terms of guidance and training, 
professional ethics looks like a low priority, not much supported by these processes. 
Our measure of informal infrastructure sought data on internal or external discussion and 
communication around ethics. Although informal infrastructure was more commonly in place, it is 
again noticeable that communication, even informally, around professional ethical issues is 
infrequent and for some does not occur at all, unless ethical discussion are taking place without the 
respondents framing them as in terms of ‘ethics’. Indeed, 7 percent of respondents indicated that 
they never discussed professional ethics issues with colleagues internally or externally, formally or 
informally. 
In terms of regulatory attitudes, the data of most note was a fairly high level of agreement that the 
Codes of Conduct should be made more relevant to the work of in-house lawyers and that it would 
be helpful to have more rules/guidance about their roles and responsibilities. 
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8 Board attendees and time in-house 
In this short chapter we deal with some issues of general interest on which our data can shed some 
light. Board participation by in-house lawyers is a subject of some interest and controversy amongst 
in-house lawyers. We can examine whether board attendees are somehow different on our 
indicators than non-board attendees. We also look at the issue of in-house experience.  
BOARD ATTENDANCE 
An interesting question is whether board attendance may have some relationship with the outlook of 
in-house lawyers. There is a vigorous debate about the appropriateness of board attendance and its 
fit with the role of GC. The debate goes to the heart of the tension between the in-house lawyer as 
an independent and wise counsellor and the in-house lawyer as a commercially oriented, team-
playing decision-maker whose advice is sought out and respected. There is a risk that a lawyer 
attending the board may be seen and may act as subservient to the directors,99 and/or than in 
attending the board the in-house lawyer becomes captured by it and so loses the potential for 
shaping the board’s actions.100 The in-house lawyer’s client is the corporation, not the board.  
The flip side is that board attendance may strengthen the connection between the in-house lawyer 
and the board (which in turn may make the board more willing to accept advice from the lawyer), 
and allow the in-house lawyer to have a closer, better insight to what the board does and the 
information it receives.101 Such attendance also, in theory, allows the board to have quick and direct 
access to independent legal advice. 102  Board attendance is also seen as a mark of career 
progression and status.  Lawyers attending the board do not, however, act as guarantors or 
guardians of ethicality. A General Counsel attended Enron’s board meetings.103 There is also some 
evidence that lawyers who attend or sit on the board are more likely to be appointed (in due course) 
the CEOs of their companies than those who do not.104 Whether or not this is a good thing is 
debateable.  
Lawyers that were on or attended the board showed significant differences from those who were not 
on the board in the following terms: 
1. They were likely to hold stronger ethical, exploitation of uncertainty, and independence 
orientations and less strong neutral advisor orientations. A commercial orientation was only 
                                               
99
 Robert E Rosen, Lawyers in Corporate Decision Making (Quid Pro Books 2010) 239. 
100
 See the discussion in: Tanina Rostain "General Counsel in the Age of Compliance: Preliminary Findings and New Research 
Questions."  (2008) 21 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 465. 
101
 ibid, 485-486 
102
 Jill E. Fisch and Kenneth M. Rosen. "Is There a Role for Lawyers in Preventing Future Enrons?." (2003) 48(4) Villanova Law Review 
1097; E. Norman Veasey, ‘Separate and Continuing Counsel for Independent Directors: An Idea Whose Time Has Not Come as a 
General Practice’ (2004) 59 BUS. LAW. 1413  
103
 For a discussion of his role, see: Deborah DeMott, "The discrete roles of general counsel." (2005) Fordham Law Review 74 . 
104
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marginally stronger than those not on or attending boards.105  The overall impact of board 
attendance is not clearly in a positive or negative direction overall, and may well depend on 
other contextual factors. 
 
Table 22: In-house lawyer roles by board attendance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Lawyers that were on or attended the board rated the organisations where they worked more 
positively in terms of their relationship with the business.  
 
Table 23: Relationship with business by board attendance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. They tended to say they used all three constellations of professional principles more 
frequently. 
 
                                               
105
 This difference was only marginally significant. 
 Member or 
attends the 
board 
Non member ANOVA 
 Mean SD Mean SD F p 
Commercial  6.51 0.61 6.31 0.72 3.64 .06 
Ethical  6.26 0.78 5.95 0.78 7.17 .01 
Exploit uncertainty 4.12 1.29 3.72 1.18 5.03 .03 
Independence  6.30 0.77 5.93 0.94 7.14 .01 
Neutral advisor 4.99 1.45 5.57 1.15 10.73 .00 
 Member or 
attends the 
board 
Non member ANOVA 
 Mean SD Mean SD F p 
Resistant /Negative 
relationship with the business 
3.83 1.40 4.61 1.24 17.18 .00 
Positive/ Supportive 
relationship with the business 
5.56 1.23 4.74 1.43 15.34 .00 
Uneven relationship with the 
business 
5.39 1.21 5.83 0.99 8.05 .00 
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Table 24: Professional principles by board attendance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The data is shown graphically in 
Figure 31 to provide an overview. Board attendance is not associated with striking or strong 
differences on this picture. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Individual commercial orientation
Individual ethical orientation
Individual exploitation of uncertainty…
Individual independence orientation
Individual advisory orientation
Resistant /Negative relationship with the…
Positive/ Supportive relationship with the…
Uneven relationship with the business
Ethical team orientation
Financial performance team orientation
Society team orientation
Productivity and strategy team orientation
Invokes independence and legality
Invokes effectiveness and integrity
Invokes client interests
Formal infrastructure
Informal infrastructure
Reports ethical pressure
Non-
board
Board
 Member or 
attends the 
board 
Non member ANOVA 
 Mean SD Mean SD F p 
Independence and Legality 
4.19 0.80 3.95 0.76 4.36 .04 
Effectiveness and Integrity 4.78 0.33 4.64 0.45 4.82 .03 
Client Interests 4.67 0.47 4.51 0.58 3.73 .05 
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Figure 31: Board members/attendees compared on orientations etc. 
 
YEARS SPENT WORKING IN-HOUSE 
Another issue of some interest is whether the outlook and approach of in-house lawyers may 
change over time. The variable 'years of working in-house' was recoded into four categories (0-5, 6-
10, 11-15 and > 15 years). The data analysis is summarised in Table 25. 
Statistically significant differences were found for the ‘Ethical orientation’ and the ‘Independence 
orientation’. In particular:106 
 Statistically significant differences between those working in-house for fewer than 5 years 
and those working in-house for more than 15 years regarding the views of in-house layer 
role in terms of ethicality and independence, with the more experienced group having 
stronger orientations to ethicality and independence. 
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 No significant differences were found among the groups regarding their ratings of the type 
of relationship with the business.  
 Statistically significant differences were found in ratings of team society orientation, 
according to the number of years working in-house. The difference on ratings of team 
orientation for society issues was found between those working in-house for 6-10 years 
(that had a particularly low societal orientation) and those working for more than 15 years. 
 No significant differences were found among the groups regarding their ratings of 
professional principles. 
 No significant differences were found among the groups regarding their ratings of ethical 
infrastructures. 
 Statistically significant differences were found in ratings of ethical pressure, according to the 
number of years working in-house, with differences found between those working in-house 
for 0-5 and 6-10 years and those working for more than 15 years.  
 
Table 25: Components examined by years working in-house 
 Years working in-house  
 0-5 6-10 11-15 >15  
Individual orientations Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD p 
Commercial  6.33 0.7 6.38 0.62 6.26 0.82 6.27 0.8 0.64 
Ethical 5.89 0.84 5.88 0.8 6.05 0.63 6.16 0.78 0.03 
Independence 5.8 0.96 5.93 0.93 5.95 0.98 6.26 0.84 0 
Neutral advisor 5.59 1.18 5.57 1.02 5.39 1.13 5.31 1.45 0.26 
Exploit uncertainties 3.66 1.15 3.81 1.15 3.62 1.18 4.01 1.29 0.1 
Relations with the business          
Resistant / Negative relationship with the 
business 
4.52 1.27 4.63 1.31 4.61 1.35 4.33 1.26 0.39 
Positive / Supportive relationship with the 
business 
4.88 1.43 4.67 1.31 4.73 1.54 5.03 1.48 0.3 
Uneven relationship with the business 5.77 1.07 5.88 1.07 5.72 0.88 5.69 1 0.56 
Team orientations          
Ethical 4.00 0.82 3.87 0.73 4.03 0.63 4.03 0.69 0.36 
Financial performance 3.43 0.98 3.5 1 3.33 1.04 3.29 1.05 0.49 
Society 3.35 1.04 3.03 1.01 3.28 0.96 3.38 0.97 0.05 
Productivity and Strategy 4.13 0.69 4.08 0.74 3.92 0.75 3.98 0.76 0.2 
Professional principles          
Independence and Legality 4.01 0.7 3.92 0.81 3.99 0.77 4.03 0.79 0.73 
Effectiveness and Integrity 4.63 0.47 4.66 0.4 4.63 0.47 4.7 0.41 0.61 
Client Interests 4.55 0.57 4.52 0.61 4.42 0.56 4.57 0.56 0.41 
Ethical infrastructure          
Formal infrastructure 2.57 1.41 2.55 1.21 2.66 1.4 2.62 1.36 0.96 
Informal infrastructure 3.53 1.5 3.52 1.48 3.44 1.53 3.72 1.55 0.65 
          
Ethical Pressure 2.8 0.96 2.79 0.92 2.91 0.95 3.19 1.1 0.01 
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The data implies that ethical pressure increases with seniority and/or experience. The same 
data was also analysed through linear regression. In those analyses, the number of years 
working in-house was a significant predictor of the views of the in-house lawyer role in terms of 
'ethicality', 'exploitation', and 'independence', as well as of ratings of 'ethical pressure', with 
lawyers working in-house for more years showing a tendency to agree more with these views. 
In contrast, lawyers working in-house for more years showed lower ratings of ‘moral 
disengagement’ than those working in-house for fewer years, although the effect was modest in 
size.107 
SUMMARY – BOARD ATTENDEES AND AGE 
There were some signs that those of our respondents who attended boards had different 
orientations. They were likely to hold stronger ethical, exploitation of uncertainty, and independence 
orientations and less strong neutral advisor orientations. A commercial orientation was only 
marginally stronger than for those not on or attending boards.  
Lawyers that were on or attended the board rated the organisations where they worked more 
positively in terms of their relationship with the business. They also tended to say they used all three 
constellations of professional principles more frequently. 
As we will see in the Chapters which follow some of these orientations suggest board membership 
may be more ethically problematic (such as an exploitation of uncertainty orientation in particular) 
and others are ethically positive. In broad terms, board membership may accentuate the agency of 
the individual lawyer (they may become a bit more ethically oriented or a bit more commercial 
oriented and a bit less likely to see themselves as a mere advisor) but the nature of the role, 
individual and context are likely as or more important and we do not in general see strong 
differences associated with Board membership. 
  
                                               
107
 R
2
 = .01 
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9 What can we say about in-house ethicality? 
In the report so far we have sought to outline differences within our sample of in-house lawyers. We 
have described how they see their role and line management orientations and examined different 
levels of pressure within their organisation. We have looked to articulate and measure different 
ways in which the in-house role is conceptualised by our respondents; what the orientation of their 
teams is perceived to be; and how they prioritise their professional principles. Finally we have 
examined professional ethical infrastructure. 
Much of this data speaks for itself – outlining differences within the in-house community and 
highlighting areas of potential concern. In this section of the report we take the debate a step further 
to look at linkages between those things that we have discussed so far and broader, externally 
validated indicators of ethical inclination for moral attentiveness and moral disengagement. 
MORAL ATTENTIVENESS 
One predictor of ethical inclination we use is moral attentiveness. This is examined across two 
dimensions: “perceptual moral attentiveness, the extent to which the individual recognizes moral 
aspects in everyday experiences, and reflective moral attentiveness, the extent to which the 
individual regularly considers moral matters.”108 A more morally attentive person is more likely to 
recall and report morally related behaviour, and moral attentiveness is associated with more moral 
behaviour.109 Interestingly, this inclination may be influenced by the environment: positive forces – 
such as an improved ethical infrastructure - can induce more moral attentiveness as can more 
negative experiences.110 
We used Reynolds’ moral attentiveness scale.111 Perceptual moral attentiveness (Figure 33) is an 
indicator of the extent to which an individual frequently recognises moral problems.112 We see a 
fairly even split between those who perceive ethical problems in their work and those tending not to. 
                                               
108
 Reynolds. S (2008), “Moral Attentiveness: Who pays attention to the moral aspects of life?” 93(5) Journal of Applied Psychology 1027-
1041 
109
 Ibid 
110
Scott J Reynolds, ‘Moral Attentiveness: Who Pays Attention to the Moral Aspects of Life?’ (2008) 93 Journal of Applied Psychology 
1027. 
111
 n 51 above 
112
The scale was reliable: α= .88 
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Figure 32: Perceptual moral attentiveness 
The second component deals with reflective moral attentiveness (Figure 34).113 We see a greater 
readiness in the respondents to say they think about the moral aspects of problems or the ethical 
implications of their decisions. 
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Figure 33: Reflective moral attentiveness 
 
MORAL DISENGAGEMENT 
Moral disengagement is our other indicator of ethical inclination.  It is said to explain a significant 
proportion of in-work relevant behaviour.114 The authors of the measure of moral disengagement 
“cautiously” suggest it is, “the strongest individual predictor of unethical behaviour identified to 
date,”115 as well as being a practical test for adult respondents which is not generally prone to 
significant social desirability biases (respondents are not likely to answer in ways significantly 
influenced by the desire to look good). It is possible also that moral disengagement is particularly 
important in organisational contexts, as Moore notes:116 
The workplace provides ample opportunities for moral disengagement: organizations tend to 
be hierarchical, providing opportunities for the displacement of responsibility; work is often 
undertaken within teams, providing opportunities for the diffusion of responsibility; 
organizational membership automatically defines the boundaries of an in-group, providing 
opportunities for moral justification (to protect the organization) and the cognitive 
minimization of the consequences of one’s actions for those who are outside the 
organization (and thus in an out-group). The propensity to morally disengage might also be 
particularly damaging in organizational life because work contexts have been documented 
as triggering amoral frames of judgment. As Jackall pointed out in Moral Mazes, 
organizations are particularly effective at assisting individuals in bracketing off moral 
schemas that guide behavior elsewhere. Thus, the propensity to morally disengage is likely 
to be particularly relevant in the prediction of unethical behavior in organizations.  
Moore et al’s scale proved reliable with our set of respondents.117 Based on eight questions,118 it 
provides a univariate (single variable) measure of relative disengagement. We do not use the 
measure to ascertain, in an absolute sense, that in-house lawyers display worrying levels of moral 
disengagement. Rather we use the scale to ascertain which in-house lawyers are more or less 
morally disengaged than others. The differences we report are statistically significant but usually 
modest in size. However, even small differences in moral disengagement have been associated 
with a significant (but modest) increase in a propensity to behave unethically.119 
Collectively we refer to these measures of moral attentiveness and disengagement as indicators of 
ethical inclination. Lower levels of moral attentiveness and higher levels of moral disengagement 
predict unethical conduct but they do not guarantee it. As such, they are proxies for ethicality: we 
                                               
114
Moore and others (n 5). 
115
ibid 40. Environmental /situational influences may for example be contrasted with influences deriving from the individual. 
116
ibid 11. 
117
α= .84 
118
 These were: (1) It is okay to spread rumours to defend those you care about; (2) Taking something without the owner's permission is 
okay as long as you're just borrowing it; (3) Considering the ways people grossly misrepresent themselves, it's hardly a sin to inflate your 
own accomplishments a bit; (4) People shouldn't be held accountable for doing questionable things when they were just doing what an 
authority figure told them to do; (5)People can't be blamed for doing things that are technically wrong when all their friends are doing it 
too; (6) Taking personal credit for ideas that were not your own is no big deal; (7) Some people have to be treated roughly because they 
lack feelings that can be hurt; and (8) People who get mistreated have usually done something to bring it on themselves. 
119
Moore and others (n 5). 
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can examine our data on in-house lawyers for signs that environment, role conception, approach to 
professional rules, etc., have some relationships with ethical inclination, but what we are not saying 
is that our data ‘proves’ certain groups of in-house lawyers are unethical. Such proof is unavailable 
and what we are able to show is something more subtle: what is likely to influence or be associated 
with ethicality. 
 
WHICH ORIENTATIONS ARE INDEPENDENTLY ASSOCIATED WITH ETHICALITY? 
We look here at individual role orientations as potential predictors of each of the three indicators of 
ethicality in our data (i.e., perceptual moral attentiveness, reflective moral attentiveness, and moral 
disengagement).  
Three linear regression models were deployed to estimate the independent contribution of each 
orientation to predict moral disengagement and the two measures of moral attentiveness.120 So, in 
Table 26, by way of example, we can see associations between our measures of ethical inclination 
and (say) an ethical orientation separately from any association with independence orientation. 
What this shows is that a stronger commercial orientation is associated with significantly lower 
perceptual moral attentiveness but significantly higher reflective moral attentiveness. Thus the more 
commercially oriented in our sample were less likely to perceive problems as moral ones but more 
likely to think about problems in moral terms. Whilst the stronger impact of the two was for 
perceptual moral attentiveness, this is an intriguing but inconclusive combination of results 
suggesting some ethical ambiguity around a commercial orientation. 
 
                                               
120
The five role orientations enabled explanation of 9% of variance in perceptual moral attentiveness, 9% of variance in reflective moral 
attentiveness and 15% variance in moral disengagement (see table below). 
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Table 26: Associations between orientations and moral attentiveness and disengagement 
Outcome variable Predictors - orientation ß Sig. η
2 
Perceptual moral 
attentiveness 
Commercial  
-.264 .000 .06 
Ethical  .212 .000 .04 
Exploitation  .072 .153 .00 
Independence  .087 .085 .01 
Neutral advisor 
-.032 .531 .00 
 R
2
 =  .09  
Reflective moral 
attentiveness  
Commercial  .269 .012 .01 
Ethical  .009 .000 .06 
Exploitation  .114 .863 .00 
Independence  .030 .025 .01 
Neutral advisor 
-.133 .549 .00 
 R
2
 =  .09  
Moral disengagement 
Commercial  -.065 .211 .00 
Ethical  -.219 .000 .04 
Exploitation  .249 .000 .06 
Independence  -.130 .008 .02 
Neutral advisor 
-.059 .221 .00 
 R
2
 = .15  
 
As one might expect, an ethical orientation predicted higher perceptual and reflective moral 
attentiveness and lower moral disengagement. An ethical orientation was thus positively associated 
with our externally validated measures of ethical inclination. 
An independence orientation also predicted higher reflective attentiveness and lower moral 
disengagement, albeit more weakly. The exploitation uncertainty orientation did not predict moral 
attentiveness, but did predict greater moral disengagement, indicating a positive association with 
this measure of concern. A neutral advisor orientation did not independently influence any indicators 
of ethical inclination. 
In broad terms, then, our data suggests predictable associations between ethical and exploitation of 
uncertainty orientations, and a more complex but somewhat negative position in relation to 
commercial orientation. 
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CLUSTER ANALYSIS - INCLINATION TO ETHICALITY 
A further, higher-level view of the data can be gained through cluster analysis, which allows to us 
examine whether different profiles of lawyers can be established in relation to their inclination to 
ethicality.  
Cluster analysis is an exploratory multivariate data analysis technique which allows to group our 
respondents into (broadly) homogeneous groups. Cases are classified according to their similarity in 
relation to a number of pre-defined attributes. We use it here to explore whether there are common 
groups or patterns of profiles of lawyers in terms of their inclination to ethicality. As lower levels of 
moral attentiveness and higher levels of moral disengagement have been shown in other studies to 
predict a greater inclination to behave unethically we classified our respondents on these three 
indicators (see appendix B).121 
The analysis produced four clusters.  
 
Figure 34: Clusters – Moral attentiveness and moral disengagement 
The clusters that emerged using Ward’s Method showed significant differences for moral 
attentiveness (perceptual and reflective) and moral disengagement. 122  Statistically significant 
different levels of moral attentiveness and disengagement are shown in Table 28 below. 
Group 1 we are calling the Capitulators: they experienced the second highest levels of ethical 
pressure and had moderately high perceptual and reflective moral attentiveness and yet also 
significantly higher levels of moral disengagement. They saw moral challenges and thought about 
moral challenges but appeared to have begun to disengage in response. Eighty-nine respondents 
were in this group.  
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Group 2 we are calling the Coasters. This was the largest group by some distance: 213 
respondents were in it. They had moderately low levels of perceptual moral attentiveness but 
moderately high reflective moral attentiveness. Yet they also had lower levels of moral 
disengagement than Group 1 and Group 4. This position was seen in the context of the second 
lowest levels of ethical pressure. Hence we speculate that this group is not yet being tested or 
testing itself in ethical terms. 
Group 3 we are calling the Champions as they had significantly higher perceptual and reflective 
moral attentiveness than the other groups and were also experiencing the greatest ethical pressure. 
They also (along with Group 2) had the lowest moral disengagement. This group had 48 
respondents. 
Group 4 contained 47 respondents. It was our smallest group and the one of most concern: we are 
calling them the Comfortably Numb. They showed a significantly higher level of moral 
disengagement than Groups 2 and 3 and the lowest levels of moral attentiveness on both 
indicators. 
 
Table 27: Clusters – Moral attentiveness and moral disengagement 
CHARACTERISATION OF THE CLUSTERS 
A multivariate analysis of variance was conducted to examine the key characteristics of the clusters 
looking at types of lawyer and sector, individual and team orientations, use of professional 
principles, ethical infrastructure and relations with the business. This analysis tells us whether there 
are significant associations between each of the clusters and these variables. For example, are 
Champions more likely to be found in business or public sectors; are they more likely to be male or 
female? Are the Comfortably Numb more likely to be commercially oriented? And so on. 
Table 28 and Appendix B summarises the results of our analysis looking at the characteristics of our 
four clusters. There were no significant differences across the clusters in terms of post qualification 
experience, size of legal team, gender, use of professional principles or work identity. 
As previously described, our Champions are the most ethically vigilant and least morally 
disengaged but also under the most ethical pressure. The analysis enables us to describe the 
characteristics associated with this cluster and so suggest (but not prove) that such characteristics 
are associated with greater ethicality (as measured by moral disengagement and attentiveness). 
 Capitulators 
 
 
Group 1 
n = 89 
Coasters 
 
 
Group 2 
n=213 
Champions 
 
 
Group 3 
n=48 
Comfortably Numb 
 
 
Group 4 
n=43 
ANOVA 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD F P 
Perceptual Moral attentiveness 4.64 .61 2.94 .94 6.11 .55 1.87 .70 324.2 .00 
Reflective Moral attentiveness 5.13 .54 5.13 .96 6.57 .48 2.18 .65 261.0 .00 
Moral disengagement 2.12 .68 1.58 .52 1.52 .64 2.03 .81 21.51 .00 
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 Champions had fewer business but more public sector lawyers and (possibly relatedly) more 
barristers than other groups. Thus 8 percent of business lawyers were classified as 
Champions, compared to 20 percent of public sector lawyers. 
 Champions worked in teams with higher perceived ethical and societal orientations than the 
other groups. 
 Champions had higher individual ethical orientation than the other groups.  
 Champions had a higher independence orientation than the Capitulators and the 
Comfortably Numb, suggesting a link between independent and ethical conceptions of the 
in-house role and inclination to behave ethically. 
 Champions invoked independence and legality principles more than Coasters and the 
Comfortably Numb, and effectiveness and integrity principles more than Capitulators and the 
Comfortably Numb.  
 Champions had stronger formal and informal ethical infrastructure than the Coasters and the 
Comfortably Numb.  
 In comparison with the Comfortably Numb, Champions had a more negative relationship 
with the business and had weaker/less even relations with the business. Champions also 
had fewer inexperienced in-house lawyers than the Comfortably Numb. 
The Capitulators present an interesting contrast with the Champions. The Capitulators’ view of the 
in-house role was less emphatic on independence and ethical orientation but was in other ways 
similar, yet they were somewhat more morally disengaged. 
The Comfortably Numb present a set of clearer differences.  
 They had the highest level of uneven relations with their employer 
 They had the lowest ethical team orientation 
 They had lower resistant/negative relations than the Capitulators and the Champions 
 Their teams had a lower society orientation than the Capitulators and the Champions 
 They had a lower rating for formal and informal ethical infrastructure than the Capitulators 
and the Champions 
 Compared to the Champions, they had lower individual ethical and independence 
orientations and they were less likely to invoke professional principles of independence and 
legality, and effectiveness and integrity. 
The main difference between the Coasters and the Comfortably Numb was the Coasters had a 
stronger ethical orientation. 
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Table 28: Summary of Cluster Analysis 
1 
Capitulators  
(n= 89) 
 
2 
Coasters  
(n= 213) 
3 
Champions  
(n= 48) 
4 
Comfortably Numb 
(n= 47) 
Mid/High Perception 
Mid Reflection 
Higher Disengagement 
Low/Mid Perception 
Mid Reflection 
Lower Disengagement 
Higher Perception 
High Reflection 
Lower Disengagement 
Low Perception 
Low Reflection 
Higher Disengagement 
More public sector 
workers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lower ethical and 
independence orientation 
than 3 
 
 
 
Higher resistant/negative 
relations with the 
business than 2 and 4. 
Lower uneven relations 
than 4 
 
 
Higher ethical orientation 
than 4 
Higher society orientation 
than 4 
 
 
Lower invocation of 
effectiveness and 
integrity than 3 
 
 
 
 
 
Higher rating of formal 
and informal 
infrastructure than 4 
 
 
 
 
Second highest 
Fewer public sector 
workers 
 
 
 
 
 
  In-House 
Lower ethical orientation 
than 3 
 
 
 
Relations with 
Lower resistant/negative 
relations than 1 
 
Lower uneven relations 
than 4 
 
Team 
Higher ethical orientation 
than 4 
 
 
 
Professional 
Lower invocation of 
independence and 
legality than 3 
 
 
 
 
Ethical 
Lower rating of formal 
and informal 
infrastructure than 3 
 
 
 
Ethical 
Second lowest 
More years in house than 
4 
More barristers or 
advocates 
Fewer business, more 
public sector workers 
 
Role 
Highest ethical 
orientation 
Higher independence 
rating than 1 and 4 
 
Business 
Higher resistant/negative 
relations with the 
business than 4 
Lower uneven relations 
than 4 
 
Orientation 
Highest ethical 
orientation  
Highest society 
orientation  
 
Principles 
Higher invocation of 
independence and 
legality than 2 and 4 
Higher invocation of 
effectiveness and 
integrity than 1 and 4 
 
Infrastructure 
Higher rating of formal 
and informal 
infrastructure than 2 and 
4 
 
 
Pressure 
Highest 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lower ethical and 
independence orientation 
than 3 
 
 
 
Lower resistant/negative 
relations than 1 and 3 
 
Highest uneven relations  
 
 
 
Lowest ethical orientation 
 
Lower society orientation 
than 1 and 3 
 
 
Lower invocation of 
independence and 
legality than 3 
Lower invocation of 
effectiveness and 
integrity than 3 
 
 
Lower rating of formal 
and informal 
infrastructure than 1 and 
3 
 
 
 
Lowest 
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DIFFERENCES IN RANKINGS ACROSS CLUSTERS 
As we noted above, the importance of difference in individual orientation, or team orientation, or the 
invocation of professional principles may be found in the way they ranked each of the elements of 
these orientations relevant to the other. Respondents from the commercial world, for example, 
tended to agree more strongly that everything ‘good’ was important or very important but if we 
looked at the relative importance they placed on the very important and the important a more 
distinctive picture emerged. To give a specific example, commercial lawyers tended to rate both 
ethics and commerciality highly as individual orientations (more highly than public and third sector 
lawyers) but when we looked at the relative ranking of these orientations it suggested that the 
commercial orientation might be the most consistently strongest orientation.  
As a result we repeated an analysis of the clusters looking at rankings of our orientations by our 
respondents. Statistically significant differences were found across our four clusters in the relative 
importance attributed to the various orientations. 
 
For individual orientations significant differences were found in rankings of commercial 123  and 
ethical orientations, 124  and a marginally significant difference in rankings of neutral advisor 
orientation.125 In particular, we see the following differences: 
 The Comfortably Numb were most likely to rank commercial orientation the most highly 
compared to the Capitulators,126 Coasters,127 and Champions.128  
 As we can see below, 70 percent of the Comfortably Numb ranked a commercial orientation 
the most strongly of the orientations. The Coasters were also significantly more 
commercially oriented on this measure than the Champions.129 
  
                                               
123
X
2
KW (3) = 12.11; p = .007, η
2
 = .03 
124
X
2
KW (3) = 15.46; p = .001, η
2
 = .04 
125
X
2
KW (3) = 7.62; p = .055, η
2
 = .02 
126
p = .029 
127
p = .031 
128
p = .001 
129
p = .019 
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Figure 35: Commercial orientation ranking by clusters 
 Higher rankings were attributed to ethical orientation by the Champions than the 
Capitulators,130 the Coasters,131 and the Comfortably Numb.132  
 As we can see, over 40 percent of the Champions ranked the ethical orientation first and 80 
percent first or second. 
 
Figure 36: Ethical orientation ranking by clusters 
 Champions ranked a neutral advisor orientation lower than Capitulators,133 Coasters134 and, 
the Comfortably Numb.135  
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 More than half of the Champions ranked the neutral adviser in the bottom two orientations. 
 
Figure 37: Neutral advisor orientation ranking by clusters 
For team orientation, significant differences were found across the four clusters in rankings of 
ethical orientation,136 financial performance,137society orientation,138 and productivity and strategy.139 
In particular: 
 The Capitulators were most likely to work within teams with a high ethical orientation . More 
so than the Coasters,140 the Champions,141 and the Comfortably Numb.142  
 The Champions ranked an ethical team orientation more highly than the other orientations 
when compared to the Coasters143 and the Comfortably Numb.144 
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Figure 38: Ethical team orientation ranking by clusters 
 The Comfortably Numb ranked financial performance higher than the Capitulators145 and the 
Champions.146  
 The Coasters ranked a financial performance team orientation more highly than the 
Champions.147 
 
Figure 39: Financial performance team orientation ranking by clusters 
 The Champions and Capitulators had teams which were reported as giving a stronger 
emphasis to a society orientation than the Coasters148 and the Comfortably Numb.149 
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Figure 40: Societal team orientation ranking by clusters 
 The teams of Champions attributed less of a priority to productivity and strategy than the 
Capitulators,150 Coasters151 and Comfortably Numb152.  
 
 
Figure 41: Productivity team orientation ranking by clusters 
For professional principles, significant differences were found across the four clusters in rankings of 
the principle of independence and legality.153 In particular: 
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 The Champions ranked the invocation of independence and legality in priority to other 
principles more often than the Capitulators154, the Coasters155 and the Comfortably Numb.156 
 
Figure 42: Invocation of independence and legality principles ranking by clusters 
 
SUMMARY – WHAT CAN WE SAY ABOUT IN-HOUSE ETHICALITY 
Through looking at moral attentiveness and moral disengagement, we use externally validated 
measures shown to be associated with ethical conduct. Lower levels of moral attentiveness and 
higher levels of moral disengagement predict a greater incidence of unethical conduct, but they do 
not guarantee it. As such, they are proxies for ethicality: we can examine our data on in-house 
lawyers for signs that environment, role conception, approach to professional rules, etc., have some 
relationships with ethical inclination, but what we are not saying is that our data ‘proves’ certain 
groups of in-house lawyers are unethical. Such proof is unavailable and what we are able to show is 
something more subtle: what is likely to influence or be associated with ethicality. 
We do this in a number of ways but for overview purposes the most interesting and helpful focus is 
on the four clusters of in-house lawyers we found within our sample: our Champions, Capitulators, 
Coasters and the Comfortably Numb.  
 The Capitulators experienced the second highest levels of ethical pressure and had 
moderately high perceptual and reflective moral attentiveness and yet significantly higher 
levels of moral disengagement. They saw moral challenges and thought about moral 
challenges but appeared to have begun to disengage in response. A total of 89 respondents 
were in this group.  
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 The Coasters were the largest group by some distance: 213 respondents were in it. They 
had moderately low levels of perceptual moral attentiveness but moderately high reflective 
moral attentiveness. Yet they also had lower levels of moral disengagement than the 
Capitulators and the Comfortably Numb. This position was seen in the context of the second 
lowest levels of ethical pressure. Hence we speculate that this group is not yet being tested 
or testing itself in ethical terms. 
 The Champions had significantly higher perceptual and reflective moral attentiveness than 
the other groups and were also experiencing the greatest ethical pressure. They also (along 
with the Coasters) had the lowest moral disengagement. This group had 48 respondents. 
 At 47 respondents our smallest group and the one of most concern was the Comfortably 
Numb. They showed a significantly higher level of moral disengagement than the Coasters 
and the Champions and the lowest levels of moral attentiveness on both indicators. 
Our Champions were thus the most ethically vigilant and least morally disengaged but also under 
the most ethical pressure. The clusters enable us to describe the characteristics associated with this 
cluster and so suggest (but not prove) that such characteristics are associated with greater ethicality 
(as measured by moral disengagement and attentiveness). 
 Proportionately fewer business lawyers, but more public sector lawyers, and (possibly 
relatedly) more barristers were Champions. Thus 8 percent of business lawyers were 
classified as Champions, compared to 20 percent of public sector lawyers. 
 Champions worked in teams with higher ethical and societal orientations than the other 
groups. 
 Champions had a stronger individual ethical orientation than the other groups.  
 Champions had a stronger independence orientation than the Capitulators and the 
Comfortably Numb, suggesting a link between independent and ethical conceptions of the 
in-house role and inclination to behave ethically. 
 Champions invoked independence and legality principles more than Coasters and the 
Comfortably Numb, and effectiveness and integrity principles more than the Capitulators and 
the Comfortably Numb.  
 Champions had stronger formal and informal ethical infrastructure than the Coasters and the 
Comfortably Numb.  
 In comparison with the Comfortably Numb, Champions had a more negative relationship 
with the business and had weaker/less even relations with the business. Champions also 
had fewer inexperienced in-house lawyers than the Comfortably Numb. 
The Capitulators present an interesting contrast with the Champions. The Capitulators’ view of the 
in-house role was less emphatic on independence and ethical orientation but was in other ways 
similar, yet they were somewhat more morally disengaged. 
The Comfortably Numb present a set of clearer differences.  
 They had the highest level of uneven relations with their employer. 
 They had the lowest ethical team orientation. 
 They had lower resistant/negative relations than the Capitulators and the Champions. 
 They had a lower group society orientation than the Capitulators and the Champions. 
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 They had a lower rating for formal and informal ethical infrastructure than the Capitulators 
and the Champions. 
 Compared to the Champions, they showed a lower individual ethical and independence 
orientations and, they were less likely to invoke professional principles of independence and 
legality and effectiveness and integrity. 
The main difference between the Coasters and the Comfortably Numb was that the Coasters had a 
stronger ethical orientation. 
When we looked at rankings we found some similar and some new associations within clusters: 
 The Comfortably Numb were most likely to rank a commercial orientation the most highly 
compared to the other groups. The Coasters were also significantly more commercially 
oriented on this measure than the Champions.  
 Higher rankings were attributed to the ethical orientation by the Champions than the other 
groups.  
 Champions also ranked a neutral advisor orientation lower than the other groups. 
 Interestingly, the Capitulators were most likely to rank an team orientation as ethical when 
compared to the other groups. Whilst the Champions ranked an ethical team orientation 
more highly when compared to the Coasters and the Comfortably Numb. 
 The Comfortably Numb ranked financial performance higher than the Capitulators and the 
Champions, and the Coasters ranked a financial performance team orientation more highly 
than the Champions. 
 The Champions and Capitulators had teams which were reported as giving a stronger 
emphasis to a society orientation than the Coasters and the Comfortably Numb. 
 The teams of Champions attributed less of a priority to productivity and strategy than other 
teams. 
For professional principles, Champions ranked the invocation of independence and legality in 
priority to other principles more often than the other groups. 
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10 Summary, discussion and conclusions 
In this Chapter, we first summarise the survey and results. We then discuss those results and draw 
some tentative conclusions. 
This survey covers 400 in-house lawyers, mainly solicitors drawn principally from England and 
Wales. This work uniquely links data on organisations, individuals, their individual and team 
identities, and approaches to professional principles to proxy data on their inclination to behave 
ethically. In this way, we map the moral compass of in-house lawyers, showing links between moral 
attentiveness and engagement and, individual and environmental factors. This provides the richest 
profiling of ethicality within the in-house community yet undertaken. 
The survey contains a wide range of experience levels, including many senior in-house lawyers. It 
engages with public, commercial and third sector in-house practice. Although broadly similar to the 
population of in-house lawyers in England and Wales in terms of gender, the sector that they work 
in, and length of experience, we do not claim that this is a fully representative sample of in-house 
lawyers. It is likely, in particular, that our survey was less often completed by those not interested in 
ethics although, as we shall see, we have within our sample a diverse range of approaches to the 
in-house role and ethics. As a result, where we estimate the frequency of (say) ethical pressure, our 
estimates are limited to our sample. Given the size of our sample, such estimates are illuminating 
and probably the best available, but they should not be held up as an accurate indicator of the size 
of the problem in practice generally. More accurate estimates would require the cooperation of fully 
random samples of in-house lawyers and such cooperation is unlikely particularly with the hardest-
to-reach groups, which would be likely to include the least ethical.  
What our approach does particularly well is provide significant insights into the differences between 
the in-house lawyers within our sample. In particular, we are able to examine the associations 
between individual, team and professional orientations and the ethical inclination of in-house 
lawyers. We map the associations between elements of their ‘moral compasses’ and how in-house 
lawyers see their role, how their teams are oriented, and pressure from the employers, and can thus 
provide fresh insights into what kinds of environment and approach make for a more or less ethical 
in-house lawyer. 
 
REPORTING LINES 
Within our sample, we see how strongly executives rather than non-executive board members 
dominate lines of management as well as lines of reporting. In particular, 53 percent of the GCs in 
our sample reported to the CEO; 16 percent to the CFO (a reporting relationships which some 
regard as problematic) and 10 percent to another board member. Only 6 percent report to a non-
executive board member or the chairman. Just under half of the in-house lawyers line-managed by 
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the CEO had a formal or informal reporting line to the chair of the board, chair of audit or other non-
executive director. 
RELATIONSHIPS WITH THEIR EMPLOYER 
Our respondents reported working in organisations where, in broad terms, they felt supported. 
However, a sizeable majority (80 percent) agreed that the legal department was sometimes 
criticised for inhibiting or slowing decisions and a majority (57 percent) that colleagues were 
sometimes reluctant to raise issues with them. Close to 50 percent agreed that actions were 
sometimes taken against their advice on legally important matters. Indeed, an unevenness of 
relationships with their organisation was commonly reported.  
Interestingly, those working in the public sector rated the legal department as having more negative 
or resistant relationships with the employer than those working in a business; and those working in 
a business felt that they had a significantly more positive or supportive relationship with the 
employer than those working in a charity or social enterprise. 
ETHICAL PRESSURE 
We also sought to measure ethical pressure: 
 About 10 percent of our respondents were asked to advise on ethically or legally debatable 
actions frequently or very frequently. Over 40 percent were asked to so advise on such 
actions at least sometimes.  
 About 10-15 percent agreed or strongly agreed that they were asked to advise on things that 
made them uncomfortable, or in ways which suggested the business took a different view on 
whether and/or how to uphold the rule of law. About a quarter to a third agreed at least 
somewhat with these concerns.  
 Interestingly, lawyers working in a public sector organisation showed significantly higher 
ratings of ethical pressure than those working in a business.  
Our analysis also indicates that ethical pressure increases somewhat with seniority and/or 
experience, although the strength of the relationship is weak, emphasising that factors other than 
seniority may be at play. 
IN-HOUSE ROLE ORIENTATIONS 
Our particular interest was in how in-house lawyers conceived of their role. We isolated five 
orientations. 
A commercial orientation was the most strongly endorsed orientation, widely agreed with by our 
respondents in all three sectors but especially amongst those working in business. Thus, large 
majorities of respondents agreed or strongly agreed that the commercial success of their 
organisation is important to them; that commercial awareness is vital to the function of in-house 
lawyers; that it is important for a legal adviser to add value to the business; and that their advice 
goes beyond legal matters to include business considerations. 
The next most strongly endorsed orientation was an ethical orientation. Most tended to agree that: 
their advice goes beyond legal considerations to assess whether something is the right thing 
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ethically to do; that where the law is uncertain, they take a lead on what the right thing to do is; and 
that where a proposed action is lawful, but they think it is nevertheless unethical, they would not 
hesitate to voice their concerns. Strong agreement with an ethical orientation was less likely than for 
commercial orientation. 
A similarly strong orientation was the independence orientation. It was generally important to our 
respondents that they can offer an independent opinion on the legality of business action and that 
their organisation needs to understand that their view is independent. Again, this orientation was 
less strongly agreed with than the commercial orientation. 
A fourth, somewhat weaker orientation, was what we call the neutral advisor orientation. A 
majority also agreed that their job was to advise on legal risk and the business decides how much 
risk it then wants to take; and that where the law is uncertain, they advise and the business decides. 
Agreement with that was less strong than for commercial, independent and ethical orientations.  
A fifth orientation was what we call an exploiting uncertainties orientation. This orientation split 
our respondents. Most tended to disagree with this as an orientation, but 36 percent of our 
respondents agreed (at least somewhat) that loopholes in the law should be identified that benefit 
the business; 19 percent agreed that their role was to exploit the law for commercial ends; and 48 
percent agreed that where the law is uncertain, they help the business benefit from that uncertainty. 
Our profiling also looks at other issues such: 
 The appetite of in-house lawyers for saying ‘No’ (the vast majority said they were willing to 
do this and back it up with further action if necessary, yet 9 percent indicated that saying “no” 
to the organisation was to be avoided, even when there is no legally acceptable alternative 
to suggest).  
 Most advised, they said, in the spirit of the law (and also said that their organisations were 
guided by this when deciding).  
 We can get a sense of the emphasis to be placed on a commercial orientation from the 65 
percent who agreed that achieving what their organisation wants has to be their main 
priority, while nearly a quarter disagreed with this statement.  
 Academic concerns about over-emphasising commercial awareness are given some support 
by 30 percent of our sample agreeing that an emphasis on commercial awareness 
sometimes inhibits the in-house lawyer in performing his or her role, whilst 57 percent 
disagreed.  
 Perhaps surprisingly, 12 percent agreed that where commercial desirability and legal 
professional judgement are in tension, commercial desirability is more important. 
There were differences in orientation across sectors (Figure 43).  In-house lawyers in business 
agreed most strongly with a commercial orientation and public sector lawyers agreed most strongly 
with an independence orientation. 
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Figure 43: Individual orientation across sectors 
 
We can also see in the public and third sectors the four strongest orientations are more closely 
aligned, whereas the hierarchy appears a bit clearer in the business sector.  We can explore this 
more closely if we look more at relative ranking of orientations (Figure 44), we can see that: lawyers 
working in a business were particularly likely to rank commercial orientation as the strongest (in their 
top two); on the other hand, public sector lawyers emphasised an independence orientation more 
strongly; and third sector lawyers emphasised an ethical orientation. The exploitation ranking was 
generally the lowest ranked orientation– though some did rank it as their strongest orientation.  
 
Figure 44: Individual orientation rankings by sector 
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It is interesting to see, too, the somewhat stronger level of agreement with commercial, ethical and 
independence orientations over a neutral advisor orientation. It is not that our sample did not 
generally agree that the in-house lawyer advises and the client decides – they did – but rather they 
emphasised orientations which saw a stronger emphasis on their own agency. In other words, they 
were more strongly in agreement with a role which saw themselves as influencers towards 
commerciality and/or ethicality, and for that influence to be exercised from a position of some 
independence, than they were to distance themselves from difficult decisions by saying that the 
client (and not them) is responsible. We see this is an important signal of maturity in the majority of 
our respondents’ approaches. 
There were some signs that those of our respondents who attended boards had different 
orientations. They were likely to hold stronger ethical, exploitation of uncertainty, and independence 
orientations and a less strong neutral advisor orientation. A commercial orientation was only 
marginally stronger than for those not on or attending boards. Lawyers that were on or attended the 
board rated the organisations where they worked more positively in terms of their relationship with 
the business. They also tended to say they used all three constellations of professional principles 
more frequently. Overall, the impact of board membership on orientation and ethicality appears 
neither clear nor strong. 
 
TEAM ORIENTATION 
Our analysis of team orientation suggested four components: an ethical orientation (where teams 
frequently discussed doing the right thing and treating people fairly; and valuing integrity as much as 
profits); a performance and productivity orientation (where teams frequently discussed strategy and 
planning, and productivity and efficiency); a financial orientation (where teams frequently discussed 
financial performance, as well as shareholders and investors); and a society orientation (where 
teams frequently discussed seeking the good of society and the organisation's role in society). 
Teams working in commercial organisations were most oriented towards productivity and strategy; 
societal orientations were much less common. Public sector lawyer teams emphasised ethicality 
most strongly followed by society and productivity/strategy. Charity/social enterprise lawyers 
emphasised society most. Both public and third sector lawyers had a significantly weaker financial 
orientation. 
PROFESSIONAL PRINCIPLES 
We analysed how our respondents conceptualised their professional responsibilities by looking at 
which professional principles most influenced them. Our respondents tended to treat what we call 
principles of independence and legality similarly. They also tended to treat a set of principles around 
what we called integrity and effectiveness similarly. And, they tended to treat the final remaining 
principle, the interests of the client, separately from these two other groups.  
As we expected, we saw the best interest of the client, and then principles of integrity and 
effectiveness as being the most influential on our respondents. Whilst all three sectors tended to 
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suggest ‘Independence and Legality’ was the least influential group of principles, it was applied 
significantly more frequently by those working in the public sector than by those working in a 
business. 
In some ways this takes us a bit further on the subtle view of in-house lawyer agency we saw when 
looking at orientations to the role. Effectiveness and integrity principles are apparently the most 
influential, alongside client interests. One interpretation is that our respondents retain a sense of 
their own integrity, and the importance of that as part of an ethical orientation, but that the strongest 
contextual influences are about being effective and serving the client’s needs.  
The stronger role of client/effectiveness principles is also interesting.  Whilst the professional 
principles support acting in the interests of the client, where that principle conflicts with others 
(notably, for the sake of this argument, upholding the rule of law and the administration of justice), 
then the SRA guidance on the principles for solicitors indicates that it is the  principle which best 
serves the public interest, and the public interest in the administration of justice, that takes 
precedence.157 
What the findings do not support is the view that in-house lawyers are not influenced by their 
professional principles in their everyday decision-making.158 Our respondents said they did call upon 
their professional principles, although this may reflect a reaction to being presented with a list of 
obligations which are, in the abstract, positive and uncontroversial. The findings do support the view 
that client-facing obligations tend to be more influential than public interest considerations but so, 
also, does integrity. The treatment of legality and public interest concerns as the least called upon of 
the professional principles is evidence that the in-house legal community surveyed here may have a 
misapprehension of its professional obligations. Barristers and solicitors are supposed to put the 
public interest and the public interest in the administration of justice first, not last where there is a 
conflict between professional principles. 
ETHICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
We were interested in exploring the extent to which professional ethical obligations were supported 
through guidance, training, appraisal, and informal discussions. Formal infrastructure looked at 
training and written guidance. A high proportion of respondents indicated in essence that there was 
no formal infrastructure or that where guidance is issued or training takes place this occurs only 
every few years. In terms of guidance and training, professional ethics looks like a low priority, not 
much supported by these processes. 
Our measure of informal infrastructure sought data on internal or external discussion and 
communication around ethics. Although informal infrastructure was more commonly in place, it is 
again noticeable that communication, even informally, around professional ethical issues was 
infrequent and for some does not occur at all, unless ethical discussion are taking place without the 
respondents framing them in terms of ‘ethics’. Indeed, seven percent of respondents indicated that 
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 SRA, ‘Handbook – The Principles’ (Version 15), para 2.2. This says: “Where two or more Principles come into conflict, the Principle 
which takes precedence is the one which best serves the public interest in the particular circumstances, especially the public interest in 
the proper administration of justice.” 
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they never discussed professional ethics issues with colleagues internally or externally, formally or 
informally. 
In terms of regulatory attitudes, the data of most note was a fairly high level of agreement that the 
Codes of Conduct should be made more relevant to the work of in-house lawyers and that it would 
be helpful to have more rules/guidance about their roles and responsibilities. 
 
ETHICAL INCLINATION 
Through looking at moral attentiveness and moral disengagement, we use externally validated 
measures shown to be associated with the inclination to behave unethically. Lower levels of moral 
attentiveness and higher levels of moral disengagement predict a greater incidence of unethical 
conduct, but they do not guarantee it. As such, they are proxies for ethicality. We have examined 
our data for signs that environment, role conception, approach to professional rules, etc., have 
some relationships with ethical inclination, but what we are not saying is that our data ‘proves’ 
certain groups of in-house lawyers are unethical. Such proof is unavailable and what we are able to 
show is something more subtle: what is likely to influence or be associated with ethicality. 
We do this in a number of ways but for overview purposes the most interesting and helpful focus is 
on the four clusters of in-house lawyers we found within our sample: Champions, Capitulators, 
Coasters and Comfortably Numb.  
 The Capitulators experienced the second highest levels of ethical pressure and had 
moderately high perceptual and reflective moral attentiveness and yet significantly higher 
levels of moral disengagement. They saw moral challenges in their work and thought about 
challenges in moral terms but appeared to have begun to disengage, perhaps in response. A 
total of 89 (22 percent) of our respondents were in this group.  
 The Coasters. This was the largest group by some distance: 213 (54 percent) of our 
respondents were in it. They had moderately low levels of perceptual moral attentiveness but 
moderately high reflective moral attentiveness. Yet they also had lower levels of moral 
disengagement than the Capitulators and the Comfortably Numb. This position was seen in 
the context of the second lowest levels of ethical pressure. Hence we speculate that this 
group is not yet being tested or testing itself in ethical terms. 
 Champions had significantly higher perceptual and reflective moral attentiveness than the 
other groups and were also experiencing the greatest ethical pressure. They also (along with 
the Coasters) had the lowest moral disengagement. This group had 48 (12 percent) 
respondents. 
 At 47 (12 percent) respondents our smallest group and the one of most concern were the 
Comfortably Numb. They showed a significantly higher level of moral disengagement than 
the Coasters and the Champions and the lowest levels of moral attentiveness on both 
indicators. 
Our Champions were thus the most ethically vigilant and least morally disengaged – indicators 
which would suggest they are the least likely to behave unethically – but they are also under the 
most ethical pressure. Our analysis enables us to describe the characteristics associated with this 
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group and so suggest (but not prove) that such characteristics are associated with greater ethicality 
(as measured by moral disengagement and attentiveness). 
 Fewer business but more public sector lawyers, and more barristers were champions than 
other groups. For example, 8 percent of business lawyers were classified as Champions, 
compared to 20 percent of public sector lawyers. 
 Champions worked in teams with higher ethical and societal orientations than the other 
groups. 
 Champions had a stronger individual ethical orientation than the other groups.  
 Champions had a stronger independence orientation than the Capitulators and the 
Comfortably Numb, suggesting a link between independent and ethical conceptions of the 
in-house role and propensity to behave ethically. 
 When it came to their professional principles, Champions invoked independence and legality 
principles more than Coasters and the Comfortably Numb, and effectiveness and integrity 
principles more than the Capitulators and the Comfortably Numb.  
 Champions had stronger formal and informal ethical infrastructures than the Coasters and 
the Comfortably Numb.  
 In comparison with the Comfortably Numb, Champions had a more negative relationship 
with the business and had weaker/less even relations with the business.  
 Champions also had fewer inexperienced in-house lawyers than the Comfortably Numb. 
The Capitulators present an interesting contrast with the Champions. The Capitulators’ view of the 
in-house role was less emphatic on independence and ethical orientation but was in other ways 
similar, yet they were somewhat more morally disengaged. This re-emphasises the importance of 
the ethical and independence orientations. 
The Comfortably Numb present a set of clearer differences:  
 they had the highest level of uneven relations with their employer. 
 they had the lowest ethical team orientation. 
 they had lower resistant/negative relations than the Capitulators and the Champions. 
 their teams had a lower society orientation than the Capitulators and the Champions. 
 they had a lower rating for formal and informal ethical infrastructure than the Capitulators 
and the Champions. 
 and, compared to the Champions, they had a lower individual ethical and independence 
orientations, and they were less likely to invoke professional principles of independence and 
legality, and of effectiveness and integrity. 
The main difference between the Coasters and the Comfortably Numb was that the Coasters had a 
stronger ethical orientation. 
We conducted a similar analysis but looking at rankings of individual orientation, team orientation, 
and approach to the professional principles. We found some similar, and some new, associations 
within clusters. The following reports only significant differences: 
 The Comfortably Numb were most likely to rank commercial orientation the most highly 
compared to the other groups.  
 The Coasters were also significantly more commercially oriented on this measure than the 
Champions.  
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 Champions ranked ethical orientation more highly than the other groups.  
 Champions also ranked the neutral advisor orientation lower than the other groups. 
 Interestingly, the Capitulators were most likely to rank an ethical team orientation highly 
when compared to the other groups, whilst the Champions ranked an ethical team 
orientation more highly when compared to the Coasters and the Comfortably Numb. 
 The Comfortably Numb ranked financial performance higher than the Capitulators and the 
Champions and the Coasters ranked a financial performance team orientation more highly 
than the Champions. 
 The Champions and Capitulators had teams which were reported as giving a stronger 
emphasis to a society orientation than the Coasters and the Comfortably Numb. 
 The teams of Champions attributed less of a priority to productivity and strategy than other 
teams. 
 For professional principles, Champions ranked the invocation of independence and legality 
in priority to other principles more often than the other groups. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
What are the key lessons that can be taken from this research? 
The first is that in-house lawyers differ significantly in how they conceive their role and that these 
variations matter. We identified five particular orientations: a commercial orientation; an 
independence orientation; an ethical orientation; a neutral advisor orientation; and an exploitation of 
uncertainty orientation. Most in-house lawyers supported the first four orientations but with important 
differences of emphasis. The exploitation of uncertainty orientation split our respondents more 
strongly – only a substantial minority agreed this was part of their role. 
It is through these orientations that we see differences in the way in-house lawyers see their role. In 
Figure 45 orientations sometimes diminishing ethical inclination exert downward pressure and 
orientations increasing ethical inclination generally exerted upward pressure. 
 
Figure 45: Five individual orientations 
 
Commercial orientation  
Neutral advisor orientation 
Exploitation of uncertainty 
orientation 
Independence orientation 
Ethical orientation 
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Amongst those working in commercial organisations in particular we found that a commercial 
orientation is both ubiquitous and strong. It was also commonly strong in the third sector. Given the 
commercial drivers within these organisations, and the legal profession’s elevation of commercial 
awareness as a key differentiator of excellence, this is unsurprising.159 Sixty-five percent of our 
respondents agreed that achieving what their organisation wants has to be their main priority. 
A more measured approach to the idea would ask what is sought from a lawyer when asking them 
to ‘be commercial’. Some elements of commerciality are unproblematic and desirable: 
understanding the business; communicating relevantly, in ways colleagues can understand; finding 
practical solutions to problems; and managing costs effectively. For others, the ethical literature 
suggests problems. Framing issues in business terms is suggested to lead to a less ethical 
approach to problems, for example. 160  Moorhead and Hinchly found that experienced lawyers 
sometimes used the term ‘commercial’ to make an implicit distinction from ‘professional’ or as an 
association with sharper practice.161 If the needs of the business are in tension with the law or with 
ethicality, then a commercial orientation has the potential to put a lawyer in an uncomfortable 
position.162 Did our evidence support these concerns? 
The answer is: up to a point. Thirty percent of our sample agreed that an emphasis on commercial 
awareness sometimes inhibits the in-house lawyer in performing his or her role. Furthermore, and 
conversely, 12 percent agreed that where commercial desirability and legal professional judgement 
are in tension, commercial desirability is more important. And whilst a strong majority of 
respondents indicated a willingness to say ‘No’ to employers – to act on occasion as legal 
policemen – and also a willingness to back that up with further action, 9 percent of our respondents 
indicated that saying ‘No’ to the organisation was to be avoided, even when there is no legally 
acceptable alternative to suggest. We also found that the group most unlikely to be ethically 
inclined, the Comfortably Numb, were significantly more likely to rank a Commercial orientation 
highly (e.g. it was the strongest orientation for over 70 percent of the Comfortably Numb compared 
to just over 30 percent of the ethical Champions). One contrary finding was that a commercial 
orientation was independently associated with a small increase in reflective moral attentiveness, but 
this was undone by a negative impact on perceptual moral attentiveness. 
This suggests that a commercial orientation can be taken too far, and it is perhaps most important 
to emphasise the positive influences of other orientations on ethicality. In particular, ethical and 
independence orientations were stronger amongst our most ethically inclined group (the 
Champions) and had the strongest positive impacts of our individual orientations on moral 
attentiveness and disengagement.  
The neutral advisor orientation is interesting. It taps into the view that the lawyer advises and the 
client decides, and thus that in-house lawyers are mere advisers. The literature suggests a risk that 
such an approach can blunt lawyers’ ethics. The risk is that in acting as a ‘mere’ advisor, the lawyer 
is distanced from ethical responsibility for their own acts. Our respondents supported the neutral 
advisor orientation but did so less strongly than the commercial, independence and ethical 
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 A Google search for ‘commercial awareness law’ produced 2.6 million results, 5 April 2016 
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Kouchaki and others (n 53). 
161
Moorhead and Hinchly (n 79). 
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 See, for example, Langevoort (n 55). 
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orientations. In this way, we can see that the lawyers see their own agency (be that commercially, 
ethically or independence oriented) as a stronger part of their role than the mere neutral advisor 
role. A sign that the neutral advisor orientation, if over-emphasised, can be problematic is seen in 
the finding that the neutral advisor orientation was lower for our most ethically inclined group.  
The exploitation of uncertainty orientation was less commonly supported by our respondents, but 
where it was supported respondents were more likely to show higher moral disengagement. 
Individual orientations were not the only factors associated with greater ethical inclination. Team 
orientations also had an influence: higher ethical and societal orientations were more likely to be 
associated with inclination to behave ethically. Our least ethically inclined group had teams 
generally more strongly oriented to financial performance, whereas our most ethically inclined group 
attributed less of a priority to productivity and strategy than other teams. 
Our prior work has suggested a great deal of variation, and some weaknesses, in the way that in-
house lawyers (and private practice commercial lawyers) understand their professional 
obligations.163 We discover in this research that in-house lawyers seem likely to think about their 
ethical obligations in three sets. One ‘set’ is based on one principle: the best interest of the client. 
Our respondents suggested this is the most influential obligation in their day-to-day practices. To 
simplify a little, this suggests a view of ethics which sees one interest as paramount. A second set of 
obligations looks to integrity and effectiveness – this is the second most commonly invoked set of 
obligations, and these obligations emphasise a broadening of ethical dialogue between two sets of 
interests: the employer’s needs and the lawyer’s ability to deliver those needs with integrity. The 
third set of obligations, less commonly invoked – but still invoked frequently according to our 
respondents – we call the independence and legality interests, as these broaden the ethical 
dialogue still further to include the interest of third parties. 
In-house lawyers differed in how strongly they emphasised each of these three groups. The 
professional principles for barristers and solicitors indicate that it is the principle(s) which best 
promote the public interest (and the public interest in the administration of justice in particular) which 
should be determinative in a situation of conflict. It might be argued that perhaps in-house lawyers 
do not often face ethical dilemmas which call into play third party interests, hence they are more 
likely to need to invoke client or effectiveness/integrity interests. For that to be true, the client or 
effectiveness interests would have to be in tension with some other interest. Without this tension, 
they do not need invoking. Either client interests are most commonly in tension with 
integrity/effectiveness issues, or legality/independence issues are more rarely invoked than they 
should be. Indeed, we might speculate that integrity issues must nearly always invoke a 
legality/independence interest of some kind – it is just less often framed in that way by our 
respondents. Our analysis is supported by other research that suggests that lawyers have a weak 
grasp of independence and are reluctant to frame issues in independence and legality terms.164 
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Figure 46: Professional Principle Clusters 
 
Our data about the inclination to behave ethically provided important insights into the potential 
influence of professional principles which go some way to underlining the importance of the way the 
professional codes frame these principles. In particular, a greater willingness to invoke 
independence and legality principles and, often also, a greater willingness to invoke effectiveness 
and integrity principles was associated with more ethical inclinations. In this way, the more inclined 
an in-house lawyer is to see their professional obligations as encompassing their client’s interest, 
and their own integrity and effectiveness, and the public interest in the administration of justice, the 
more likely they are to act ethically and in accordance with their own code.  
We are exploring some of these issues in more depth in focus groups and interviews. Our view 
based on our other work is that professional ethics is a somewhat neglected element of professional 
practice both in-house and in private practice. Our concern has been underlined by the low levels of 
ethical infrastructure, whether formal (training, guidance and appraisals) or informal (discussion), as 
reported by our respondents. The management literature suggests that such infrastructure can be, 
but is not always, an important influence on ethicality.165 Our data suggests that the more ethically 
inclined of our respondents have stronger formal and informal ethical infrastructures, emphasising 
the potential significance of quite modest improvements in ethical infrastructure. The numbers of 
respondents reporting that professional ethical issues were not dealt with even annually by way of 
training and discussion is surprising. 
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•Acting with integrity 
•Providing a proper standard of service to the 
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•Carrying out your role in the organisation 
effectively and in accordance with proper 
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• Complying with your own legal and regulatory obligations 
as a lawyer 
• Dealing with your own regulators in an open, timely and 
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A particularly interesting set of findings relates to the relationships between the employer and the 
lawyer and approaches to ethics. In particular, our most ethically inclined group also operated in the 
environment with the most ethical pressure. This is a reminder that tension between the employer 
and the lawyer can be dealt with positively. Our Champions had a more negative relationship with 
the business and had weaker/less even relations with the business, yet they remained the most 
ethically vigilant. They were also somewhat more experienced than our most worrying group, the 
Comfortably Numb. We also saw, with our group called the Capitulators, how such ethical pressure 
can be associated with moral disengagement – suggesting that some respond more negatively to 
ethical pressure by beginning to disengage. Those in-house lawyers who seemed to respond 
positively to the pressure were supported by a more ethical, independent outlook, more ethical and 
societally oriented teams and a somewhat stronger ethical infrastructure. The lower levels of moral 
attentiveness indicated by some of our in-house lawyers also suggest that some, when recording an 
absence of ethical pressure, may not be sensitive enough to the issues that face them. 
The importance of context can be further seen in the modest but significant signs of disquiet that our 
respondents reported in their framing of the role of in-house lawyers around ethicality and what 
might be called rule of law challenges. 10 percent of our respondents were asked to advise on 
ethically or legally debatable actions frequently or very frequently, and 40 percent were asked to 
advise on such actions at least sometimes.  Similarly, a sizeable majority (80 percent) agreed that 
the legal department was sometimes criticised for inhibiting or slowing decisions, and a majority (57 
percent) agreed that colleagues were sometimes reluctant to raise issues with the business. Close 
to 50 percent agreed that actions were sometimes taken against their advice on legally important 
matters.  
Our level of concern with this depends, of course, on how their employers respond to advice on 
such actions. More clearly concerning is the 10-15 percent who agreed or strongly agreed that they 
were asked regularly or very frequently to advise on things that made them uncomfortable, or in 
ways which suggested the business took a different view on whether and/or how to uphold the rule 
of law. Given reported changes within at least parts of the Government Legal Service suggesting a 
heightened appetite for legal risk, which some criticise as a disregard for the rule of law,166 it is 
worth emphasising that lawyers in public sector organisations showed higher ratings of ethical 
pressure than those working in a business. Interestingly those working the public sector also rated 
the legal department as having more negative/resistant relationships with the employer than those 
working in a business. 
IMPLICATIONS 
This report provides a unique profile of real differences within the in-house community. We examine 
individual and team orientations to the in-house role; the invocation of professional principles; 
ethical infrastructure, ethical pressure and relationships with the employer; and we relate these to 
externally validated indicators of ethical inclination (moral attentiveness and moral disengagement). 
It is as rich a picture of what it means to be an ethical in-house lawyer as has been attempted but 
much more can be and, we hope, will be done to develop understanding in the area.  
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This work is part of a broader study. We are engaging in discussions with the in-house community 
at town hall meetings and we are conducting further interviews. Through these mechanisms we are 
planning to contextualise our findings and think in greater detail about the implications of our results.  
The plan is to produce a white paper which sets out ideas about how best to structure the in-house 
role and manage in-house legal functions for ethical practice. This white paper will be led in large 
part by discussion with the in-house community, and informed by our ongoing research. For now, 
we make the following observations: 
 The varied understandings of the in-house role suggest that in-house teams should engage 
in an honest and open evaluation of their own approaches and consider where on the 
spectrum of approaches we have outlined they sit. 
 The evaluation should engage the employer and their in-house teams. 
 The balance between a commercial (or, outside business, a client focused) orientation and 
independence and ethical orientations should be a particular focus of this review, with 
consideration given to how independence and ethicality is part of the role description, 
reporting and day-to-day management of in-house lawyers. 
 The balancing and use of professional principles in day-to-day practice, especially those that 
promote integrity, independence and ethicality, should be considered and supported. 
 The approach to managing for ethicality though ethical infrastructure such as training, 
guidance and appraisal should be considered as a matter of urgency. 
 
-end- 
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Appendix A: 
DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS ANALYSES 
Principal component analysis (PCA) is an exploratory multivariate analysis technique that allows the 
transformation of a set of correlated variables into a subset of independent variables. These 
independent variables  are linear combinations of the original variables and are called “principal 
components”. Thus, a PCA allows to reduce the complexity of the data, summarising the information 
present in correlated– and thus, to a certain extent, redundant– variables into independent variables 
which represent a big proportion of the information contained in the original variables. We use it 
here to reduce the number of variables included in the analyses, retaining the analytic dimensions 
that underlie substantively different sets of variables. 
Besides the input variables being metric, and having at least 5 times more cases (i.e., participants) 
than the number of variables, the input variables should be correlated in order to run a PCA. We 
have verified the correlation among input variables using the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) statistic, 
which varies between 0 and 1. The higher the KMO, the higher the correlation between input 
variables and thus, the more consistent should be the extracted principal components. 
For deciding how many components to extract and retain in the final solution, we have used the 
following criteria: 1) Kaiser criteria, retaining all components showing and eigenvalue higher than 1 
and 2) Scree test, which involves examining the graphical representation of the eigenvalues and 
finding the natural bend or break point in the data where the curve flattens out. The number of 
factors to retain is usually the number of data points above the “break” (i.e., not including the point 
at which the break occurs).  
It is also important to look at the commonalities, i.e., part of variance of each original variable that is 
captured by the extracted components. Commonalities lower than .05 are considered to be low, 
indicating that the original variable is not well represented in the final solution of extracted 
components. In those cases we have considered deleting the variables showing low commonalities 
and running a new PCA without those variables. 
Finally, it is common to use rotation in order to simplify and clarify the data structure, making the 
extracted components easier to interpret substantively. There are a number of possible rotation 
methods that can be used. Varimax is the most commonly used orthogonal method. Orthogonal 
methods produce factors that are uncorrelated; however, in social sciences it is reasonable to 
expect some correlation among factors, since cognitive and/or behavioural factors tend to be 
interdependent. Also, it has been verified167 that if factor correlations exceed .32 there is 10% (or 
more) overlap in variance among factors, which is enough variance to warrant oblique rotation. 
Thus, in those cases we have opted to use the Oblimin rotation method. 
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IN-HOUSE LAWYER ROLE  
A principal component analyses was run for items assessing in-house lawyer roles. KMO was 
acceptable (.79). 
Eight components were extracted on the basis of the following criteria: a) retaining components that 
have eigenvalues > 1 and b) scree test. The eight components explained 56.7% variance. 
Communalities were below .50 for items 5, 16 and 20 and thus they were taken out from the 
analysis and the procedure was repeated. Items with factor loadings below |.50| or loading heavily 
in more than one factor are signalled in red and were excluded. 
Table A1: Rotated component matrix of in-house lawyer role 
 
Component 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Q24_4 .786      .112  
Q24_6 .764  .105      
Q24_8 .702 .286   .140  .293 .105 
Q24_7 .587 .293 .135  .118  .104  
Q24_18  .805       
Q24_24 .255 .684  .148     
Q24_21  .626 .120 .137 -.219   .162 
Q24_17 .269 .481  .110 .283 -.102 .291  
Q24_13 .181 -.115 .791   .100   
Q24_15  .141 .789  .188   .119 
Q24_14 .101  .763 .144  .153  -.165 
Q24_22 -.119 .101  .756   .208  
Q24_26 .168 .171  .696 .156 -.137 .110  
Q24_3     .840    
Q24_12   .130  .815 .132   
Q24_10 -.184  .160 -.183 .134 .610  -.186 
Q24_9 .161 -.162 .288 -.214  .540 .140 -.110 
Q24_23 -.337    .111 .532 .137 .308 
Q24_11 -.185 -.356 .103  .292 .531  -.104 
Q24_25 .324 .224 -.177 .358  .495 -.222  
Q24_1 .255  .123 .180   .662 -.203 
Q24_2 .272 .154 .190 .308   .631 .123 
Q24_19 .103 .340  -.293   .412 .237 
Q24_27 .145    .129 -.190  .717 
Q24_28    .420  .107 -.258 .594 
Note.Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis; Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser 
Normalization.Rotation converged in 12 iterations. 
 
 
Factor 1: Commercial orientation (α= .78) 
 The commercial success of my organisation is important to me 
 Commercial awareness is vital to the function of in-house lawyers 
 Our advice goes beyond legal matters to consider business considerations 
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 It is important for a legal adviser to add value to the business: 
 
Factor 2: Ethical orientation (α= .66) 
 My advice goes beyond legal considerations to assess whether something is the right thing 
ethically to do 
 Where a proposed action is lawful, but I think it is nevertheless unethical, I will not hesitate to 
voice my concerns 
 Where the law is uncertain, I take a lead on what the right thing to do is 
 
Factor 3: Exploitation orientation (α= .74) 
 Loopholes in the law should be identified that benefit the business 
 Where the law is uncertain, I help the business benefit from that uncertainty 
 My role is to exploit the law for commercial ends 
 
Factor 4: Independence orientation (α= .61) 
 The organisation needs to understand that my view is independent 
 It is important to me that I can offer an independent opinion on the legality of business action 
 
Factor 5: Advisory orientation (α= .72) 
 My job is to advise on legal risk and the business decides how much risk it then wants to 
take 
 Where the law is uncertain, we advise and the business decides 
 
Factor 6: The subservient adviser orientation (α = .56) 
 Saying “no” to the organisation is to be avoided, even when there is no legally acceptable 
alternative to suggest 
 Where commercial desirability and legal professional judgement are in tension, commercial 
desirability is more important. 
 An emphasis on commercial awareness sometimes inhibits the in-house lawyer in 
performing his or her role 
 Others in the organization are responsible for considering the ethics of its decisions; my role 
is to advise on the law 
 
Factor 7: Risk management orientation (α= .57) 
 My job is to manage to a known risk appetite 
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 My job is to help set appetite for risk within legal bounds 
 
Factor 8:Legality orientation (α= .28) 
 Insisting something cannot be done within the law is sometimes necessary 
 Sometimes it’s necessary to think less about the organisation’s needs and more about what 
the law requires 
 
ORGANISATIONAL APPROACHES TO LEGAL  
 
A principal component analyses was run for items assessing organisational approaches to legal. 
KMO was acceptable (.76). 
On the basis of the following criteria a)retaining components that have eigenvalues > 1 and b) scree 
test, three components were extracted. The three components explained 76.3% variance. 
Communalities were all above .50. Given that some of the correlations between the three 
components exceeded .32168, oblique rotation (i.e. oblimin) was performed. 
 
Table A2: Rotated component matrix of organisational approaches to legal 
 
 
Component 
1 2 3 
Q25_4 .860   
Q25_3 .788   
Q25_5 .733   
Q25_1  .933  
Q25_2  .915  
Q25_7   -.951 
Q25_6   -.857 
Note.Extraction Method: Principal Component 
Analysis; Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser 
Normalization. Rotation converged in 5 iterations. 
 
 
Factor 1: Resistant/Negative relationship with the business (α= .71) 
 Colleagues are sometimes reluctant to raise matters with in-house lawyers 
 The legal function is sometimes criticised for inhibiting or slowing business decisions 
                                               
168
 Brown (2009). Choosing the Right Type of Rotation in PCA and EFA. Retrieved from: http://jalt.org/test/PDF/Brown31.pdf 
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 The organisation sometimes takes actions which are against my advice on legally important 
matters 
 
Factor 2: Positive and supportive relationship with the business (α= .84) 
 There is a clear and common understanding within the business of what the role of the legal 
function is 
 The independence of the legal function within the business is strongly supported by the 
business functions 
 
Factor 3: Uneven relationship with the business (α= .80) 
 Parts of the business are more challenging to in-house lawyers than others 
 Parts of the business are more supportive of legal than others 
 
 
TEAM ORIENTATION 
 
A principal component analyses was run for items assessing team orientation. KMO was acceptable 
(.75). 
On the basis of the following criteria a) retaining components that have eigenvalues > 1 and b) 
scree test, 4 components were extracted. The four components explained 75.7% variance. 
Communalities were all above .50.  
Given that some of the correlations between the four components exceeded .32, oblique rotation 
(i.e., oblimin) was performed. 
 
Table A3: Rotated component matrix of team orientation 
 
 
Component 
1 2 3 4 
Q26_1 .851 .102   
Q26_5 .771    
Q26_3 .720 -.131 -.104  
Q26_8  .860 .222  
Q26_6  .802 -.164 -.134 
Q26_2   -.885  
Q26_4 .116  -.840  
Q26_9 .119  .144 -.946 
Q26_7 -.154 .324 -.240 -.647 
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Factor 1: Ethical orientation (α= .73) 
 Doing the right thing 
 Valuing integrity as much as profits 
 Treating people fairly 
 
Factor 2: Financial performance (α= .62)  
 Shareholders and investors 
 Financial performance 
 
Factor 3: Society orientation (α= .82) 
 Seeking the good of society  
 The organisation’s role in society 
 
Factor 4: Productivity and strategy (α= .70) 
 Productivity and efficiency 
 Strategy and planning 
 
PROFESSIONAL PRINCIPLES  
 
A principal component analyses was run for items assessing professional principles. KMO was good 
(.86). 
On the basis of the following criteria a) retaining components that have eigenvalues > 1 and b) 
scree test, three components were extracted. The three components explained 65.6% variance. 
Communalities were all above .50 (except for item 8 that was .48).  
Given that some of the correlations between the four components exceeded .32, oblique rotation 
(i.e., oblimin) was performed. 
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Table A4: Rotated component matrix of professional principles 
 
 
Component 
1 2 3 
Q27_5 .860 -.165 .159 
Q27_1 .770   
Q27_3 .706 .166 -.309 
Q27_8 .702   
Q27_7 .605 .284 -.120 
Q27_9  .872 -.103 
Q27_6  .714 .261 
Q27_2 .152 .676 .115 
Q27_4  .226 .856 
 
Factor 1: Independence and legality (α= .81) 
 Maintaining the trust the public places in you and in the provision of legal services 
 Upholding the rule of law and the proper administration of justice 
 Preventing my independence from being compromised 
 Dealing with your own regulators in an open, timely and co-operative manner; 
 Complying with your own legal and regulatory obligations as a lawyer 
 
Factor 2: Effectiveness and integrity (α= .71)  
 Carrying out your role in the organisation effectively and in accordance with proper 
governance and sound financial and risk management principles 
 Providing a proper standard of service to the business 
 Acting with integrity 
 
Factor 3: Client’s interests 
 Acting in the best interests of the organisation 
 
ETHICAL INFRASTRUCTURE  
A principal component analyses was run for seven items related to ethical infrastructure. KMO was 
good (.80). However, the scale used in one of the items was very different from the other ones – 
and communality of that item was very low. Thus, a subsequent principal component analyses was 
run without it. KMO was acceptable/good (.79). 
On the basis of the following criteria a)retaining components that have eigenvalues > 1 and b) scree 
test, 2 components were extracted. The two components explained 62.7% variance. Communalities 
were acceptable (above .50 except for item 2 that was .49).  
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Given that some of the correlations between the components exceeded .32, oblique rotation (i.e., 
oblimin) was performed. 
Table A5: Rotated component matrix of ethical infrastructure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Factor 1: Formal infrastructure (α= .70) 
 Through professional ethics training delivered by internal providers 
 Through other written guidance from the organisation 
 Through professional ethics training delivered by external providers 
 
Factor 2: Informal infrastructure (α= .67)  
 How frequently do you communicate with other in-house lawyers about ethics and conduct 
issues 
 Through informal discussions of professional ethics with others outside the organisation 
 Through informal discussions of professional ethics within the organisation 
 
 
 
REGULATION OF IN-HOUSE LEGAL ROLE  
A principal component analyses was run for items related to the regulation of in-house legal role. 
KMO was poor (.55). 
On the basis of the following criteria a) retaining components that have eigenvalues > 1 and b) 
scree test, 5 components were extracted. Communality of item Q33_5 was low (.38), thus this item 
was taken out and other PCA was run. Through scree test, only 4 components were extracted and 
these components explained 78.4 % variance. All communalities were then good. 
Given that some of the correlations between the components exceeded .32, oblique rotation (i.e., 
oblimin) was performed. 
 
 
Component 
1 2 
Q29_3 .898  
Q29_1 .780  
Q29_2 .679  
Q31 -.122 .875 
Q29_5  .736 
Q29_4 .358 .541 
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Table A6: Rotated component matrix of in-house legal role 
 
 
 
Component 
1 2 3 4 
Q33_8 .908 -.104   
Q33_7 .834 .118  -.182 
Q33_3 .129 .899   
Q33_4 .183 -.747   
Q33_1  .102 .862 -.127 
Q33_2  -.113 .805 .190 
Q33_6    .958 
 
Note.Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis; 
Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization. 
Rotation converged in 7 iterations. 
 
 
Factor 1: Codes could be more useful (α= .73) 
 The professional codes of conduct should be made more relevant to the work of in-house 
lawyers  
 It would be helpful to have more [rules/guidance] about the appropriate roles and 
responsibilities of in-house lawyers 
 
Factor 2: Desired regulation amount (α= .57) 
 There is too much regulation of in-house lawyers 
 There is not enough regulation of in-house lawyers (rev) 
 
 
 
Factor 3: Codes are used (α= .59) 
 We have reviewed applicable lawyer professional codes of conduct and documented a 
response to them 
 Lawyers’ professional codes of conduct have a material, day to day impact on the operations 
of me and/or my team 
 
Factor 4: Addresses the needs 
 The Solicitors’ Code of Conduct addresses the needs of in house lawyers well. 
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MORAL ATTENTIVENESS  
A principal component analyses was run for items assessing moral attentiveness. KMO was good 
(.82).  
On the basis of the following criteria a) retaining components that have eigenvalues > 1 and b) 
scree test, two components were extracted. Communalities were all above .50.  
Given that some of the correlations between the components exceeded .32, oblique rotation (i.e., 
oblimin) was performed. The solution obtained, with two factors, and replicates what was expected 
from the use of this scale.  
 
Table A7: Rotated component matrix of moral attentiveness  
 
Component 
1 2 
Q36_1 .983 -.145 
Q36_2 .809 .156 
Q36_4 .788 .177 
Q36_3  .912 
Q36_5  .887 
Note.Extraction Method: Principal Component 
Analysis; Rotation Method: Oblimin with 
Kaiser Normalization; Rotation converged in 5 
iterations. 
 
 
Factor 1: Perceptual moral attentiveness (α= .88) 
 In a typical day, I face several ethical dilemmas.  
 I regularly face decisions that have significant ethical implications 
 I frequently encounter ethical situations. 
 
Factor 2: Reflective moral attentiveness (α= .80) 
 I regularly think about the ethical implications of my decisions 
 I often reflect on the moral aspects of my decisions. 
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ETHICAL PRESSURE  
A principal component analyses was run for item assessing ethical pressure. KMO was adequate 
(.72).  
On the basis of the following criteria a)retaining components that have eigenvalues > 1 and b) scree 
test, 2 components were extracted. Communalities were all above .50.  
Given that some of the correlations between the components exceeded .32, oblique rotation (i.e., 
oblimin) was performed. 
 
Table A8: Rotated component matrix of ethical pressure 
 
Component 
1 2 
Q38 .913  
Q37 .823  
Q36_7  -.943 
Q36_6 .125 -.797 
 
 
Factor 1: Environmental pressure (α= .69)  
 How often are you asked to advise on something where the legality of a proposed action by 
the organisation is debatable  
 How often are you asked to advise on something where the ethicality (as opposed to the 
legality) of a proposed action by the organization is debatable.  
 
Factor 2: Ethical pressure (α= .71) 
 I'm sometimes asked to advise or assist on things that make me uncomfortable ethically  
 There are tensions between the way I and the business respects obligations to uphold the 
law. 
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MORAL DISENGAGEMENT  
 
A principal component analyses was run for item assessing moral disengagement. KMO was good 
(.84).  
On the basis of the following criteria a)retaining components that have eigenvalues > 1 and b) scree 
test, either one or two components could be extracted.Given that some of the correlations between 
the components exceeded .32, oblique rotation (i.e., oblimin) was performed. 
As can be observed from the two components solution below, all items showed higher loadings on 
the first component, and thus we decided to retain only the first component, which also replicated 
the original measure of moral disengagement.  
 
Table A8: Rotated component matrix of moral disengagement 
 
 
Component 
1 2 
Q40_5 .773 -.305 
Q40_6 .731 -.105 
Q40_3 .718  
Q40_1 .696  
Q40_2 .693 -.179 
Q40_7 .657 .569 
Q40_8 .646 .591 
Q40_4 .628 -.477 
 
 
Factor 1: Moral disengagement (α= .84) 
 People shouldn't be held accountable for doing questionable things when they were just 
doing what an authority figure told them to do. 
 People can't be blamed for doing things that are technically wrong when all their friends are 
doing it too.  
 Taking something without the owner's permission is okay as long as you're just borrowing it. 
 Taking personal credit for ideas that were not your own is no big deal.  
 Considering the ways people grossly misrepresent themselves, it's hardly a sin to inflate 
your own accomplishments a bit. 
 It is okay to spread rumours to defend those you care about. 
 People who get mistreated have usually done something to bring it on themselves 
 Some people have to be treated roughly because they lack feelings that can be hurt.  
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Appendix B: 
DETAILED ANALYSIS OF THE CLUSTERS 
Cluster Analysis is an exploratory multivariate data analysis technique which allows us to group our 
respondents into (broadly) homogeneous groups. Cases are classified according to their similarity in 
relation to a number of pre-defined attributes. We use it here to explore whether there are common 
groups or patterns of profiles of lawyers in terms of their inclination to ethicality. 
There are several methods for doing cluster analysis: hierarchical cluster analysis, K-means cluster 
analysis and two-step cluster analysis. We have opted for hierarchical cluster analysis as these are 
more adequate for small datasets (in contrast with two step cluster analysis) and do not require an a 
priori definition of the number of clusters to be extracted (as in K-Means cluster analysis). 
We have used the squared Euclidian distance as a measure of similarity between cases, as this is 
the most conventional measure that is used when dealing with numeric variables. In order to 
determine the distance between clusters, we have compared the solution when using the two most 
commonly used methods: furthest neighbour (or complete linkage) method and the Ward method.  
As there is no statistical criteria that can be used to decide the number of clusters to retain, nor the 
method to determine the distances between clusters, the decision was based on the analysis of the 
graphical representation of the fusion coefficients and the analytical interpretation of clusters that 
were derived through both the furthest neighbour and Ward methods. The graphical representations 
of fusion coefficients derived from both methods suggested that a solution with four clusters would 
be the most adequate, and the clusters derived from Ward method were considered the most 
pertinent from a substantive analytical point of view. Therefore, the results reported regarding this 
cluster analysis correspond to the four clusters that were extracted from Ward method. 
 
CLUSTERS AND BACKGROUND VARIABLES  
A marginally significant difference across the different clusters was found for the ‘number of years 
working in-house’ (see Table 29 below), with cluster 3 showing a higher mean of years working in-
house in comparison to cluster 4.169Chi-square tests also revealed statistically significant differences 
across the clusters in terms of ‘professional qualifications’,170 with more respondents in cluster 3 
identifying themselves being qualified as barrister or advocate than in the other clusters, and in 
relation to the ‘organisation sector’171 and with respondents of cluster 1 working more in the public 
sector, respondents of cluster 2 working less in the public sector, and respondents of cluster 3 
working less in a business and more in the public sector.  
                                               
169
p =.063 
170

2 
(3) = 9.89, p =.02 
171
(
2 
(6) = 33.20, p<.001) 
 
Ethical Leadership for In-House Lawyers  
119 | P a g e  
 
No significant differences172 were found among the different clusters regarding: (i) number of years 
since qualification; (ii) size of organization legal team; (iii) gender; (iv) professional role; and (v) work 
identity. 
Table 29: Clusters in relation to organisation and background variables 
 Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 ANOVA 
 Mea
n 
SD Mea
n 
SD Mean SD Mean SD F P 
Years working in-
house 
10.7
3 
8.16 10.7
3 
8.23 13.8
2 
9.90 9.52 8.09 
2.38 .07 
Years since 
qualification 
15.9
0 
9.42 15.7
7 
9.60 18.0
0 
9.60 15.73 9.89 
0.75 .52 
Size of legal team 98.4
6 
448.6
7 
99.8
3 
294.2
9 
72.5
3 
164.21 53.13 166.0
9 
0.36 .79 
 
A Multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA), which is a multivariate procedure for testing whether 
significant differences exist between groups in two or more dependent variables, was used for 
testing whether the clusters differed in relation to a number of features. The choice for using 
MANOVA instead of multiple ANOVAs for each dependent variable was made to avoid artificially 
increasing the odds of incorrectly rejecting a true null hypothesis or a "false positive" by running 
multiple tests, which is especially relevant when the dependent variables are correlated. The 
MANOVA was significant173 and was followed by significant tests involving individual dependent 
variables separately (ANOVA’s in this case), to determine in relation to which specific variables the 
groups differed significantly. 
These analyses revealed statistically significant differences across the clusters regarding 
respondents’ views of:  
a) the in-house lawyer role in terms of commercial, ethical , independence, and subservient 
orientations, with cluster 3 showing higher ratings of ethical orientation than the other 
clusters and higher independence orientation than clusters 1 and 4, and cluster 1 
showing higher ratings of subservient orientation than clusters 2 and 3.  
 
                                               
172
 α >.10 
173
Pillais’ Trace = .65, F(60, 1050) = 4.91, p< .001. 
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 Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 ANOVA 
Orientation Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD F P 
Commercial  
6.17 0.78 6.39 0.68 6.28 0.71 6.43 0.76 2.23 0.08 
Ethical  5.77 0.70 6.03 0.79 6.46 0.53 5.69 0.92 10.56 0.00 
Exploitation of 
uncertainty  
3.98 1.18 3.72 1.17 3.90 1.23 3.70 1.29 1.17 0.32 
Independence  5.90 0.87 5.95 0.95 6.34 0.72 5.72 1.11 3.58 0.01 
Neutral advisor 5.49 1.22 5.48 1.23 5.54 1.08 5.44 1.21 0.06 0.98 
 
b) the relationship with the business, namely resistant /negative and uneven relationships 
with the business, with cluster 1 showing higher ratings of resistant/negative relationship 
with the business than clusters 2 and 4, and cluster 3 showing higher ratings than cluster 
4, and cluster 4 showing lower ratings of uneven relationship with the business than the 
other three clusters.  
 
 Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 ANOVA 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD F P 
Resistant / Negative relationship with the business 
5.07 1.04 4.37 1.32 4.93 1.17 3.88 1.33 11.69 0.00 
Positive / Supportive relationship with the business 4.99 1.35 4.82 1.42 4.83 1.58 4.59 1.52 0.75 0.52 
Uneven relationship with the business 5.82 0.92 5.80 1.03 6.07 0.74 5.33 1.22 4.13 0.01 
 
c) team orientation in terms of ethical and society orientations, with cluster 3 showing 
higher ratings of ethical orientation than the other three clusters, and clusters 1 and 2 
showing higher ratings than cluster 4, and cluster 3 showing higher ratings of society 
orientation than the other 3 clusters, and cluster 1 showing higher society orientation 
than cluster 4. 
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 Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 ANOVA 
Team orientations Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD F P 
Ethical  
4.01 0.65 3.93 0.71 4.57 0.56 3.54 0.82 17.27 0.00 
Financial 
performance 
3.24 1.01 3.46 1.05 3.41 0.81 3.48 1.06 0.99 0.40 
Society 3.35 0.89 3.17 0.97 3.95 1.10 2.78 0.98 11.79 0.00 
Productivity and 
strategy 
3.98 0.70 4.08 0.72 4.07 0.76 3.98 0.89 0.47 0.70 
 
d) professional principles, namely independence and legality, effectiveness and integrity , 
with cluster 3 showing higher ratings of independence and legality than clusters 2 and 4 
and higher ratings of effectiveness and integrity than clusters 1 and 4. 
 Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 ANOVA 
 Mea
n 
SD Mea
n 
SD Mean SD Mean SD F P 
Independence and 
legality  
4.04 
0.68 3.91 0.77 4.38 0.73 3.71 0.83 
6.89 0.00 
Effectiveness and 
integrity 
4.58 0.46 4.68 0.44 4.79 0.34 4.50 0.45 
4.51 0.00 
Client interests 4.41 0.67 4.56 0.55 4.54 0.55 4.59 0.55 1.41 0.24 
 
 
e) ethical infrastructure, both formal and informal, with cluster 3 showing higher ratings of 
both formal and informal ethical infrastructure than clusters 2 and 4 and cluster 1 
showing higher ratings than cluster 4 on both formal and informal ethical infrastructures.  
 Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 ANOVA 
 Mea
n 
SD Mea
n 
SD Mean SD Mean SD F P 
Formal infrastructure  
2.77 1.25 2.50 1.29 3.16 1.53 2.02 1.24 
6.26 0.0
0 
Informal 
infrastructure 
3.82 1.27 3.52 1.44 4.31 1.35 2.28 1.32 
17.2
2 
0.0
0 
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f) ratings of ethical pressure, with all clusters showing significantly different ratings of 
informal ethical pressure, the highest ethical pressure being rated by cluster 3, followed 
by cluster 1, 2 and 4, respectively.174 
 Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 ANOVA 
 Mea
n 
SD Mea
n 
SD Mean SD Mean SD F P 
Ethical pressure 3.28 0.78 2.66 0.83 4.06 1.05 2.12 0.63 
53.2
7 
0.0
0 
 
                                               
174
For this analysis, we conducted a MANOVA followed by post-hoc multiple comparisons 
